Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 101<br />
itself to use its best endeavours to prevent the pollution of the sea by m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
th<strong>at</strong> is liable to cause harm to the marine environment and its living<br />
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including<br />
fishing, impairment of quality for use of sea w<strong>at</strong>er, or reduction of<br />
amenities.” (Text of Draft Articles of a Convention for the Prevention of<br />
Marine Pollution by Dumping, <strong>IMO</strong>D/2 (April 15, 1972), p. 3) Article 2<br />
said: “The Parties shall take effective measures individually, according to<br />
their capability, and collectively to prevent marine pollution caused by the<br />
dumping of harmful m<strong>at</strong>ter and shall harmonize their policies in this<br />
regard.” (ibid.)<br />
The phrase “to use its best endeavors” was obviously less binding than<br />
any phrase examined by the drafting group. It was used because represent<strong>at</strong>ives<br />
of developing countries were opposed to general provisions th<strong>at</strong> they<br />
thought would impose unacceptable constraints on their economies.<br />
Though developing countries supported the most stringent possible annexes<br />
and criteria for dumping permits, they opposed general provisions th<strong>at</strong> proclaimed<br />
an overall restrictive and prohibitory dumping policy. Essentially,<br />
while developing countries favored stringent standards, they wished to<br />
avoid oblig<strong>at</strong>ions th<strong>at</strong> might hinder their industrializ<strong>at</strong>ion. Negoti<strong>at</strong>ors<br />
expected this conflict to resume <strong>at</strong> Stockholm (memo, Ministry of Foreign<br />
Affairs, Denmark (May 1, 1972), p. 7).<br />
The question of which substances would be completely prohibited to<br />
dump (“blacklisted” substances) and which substances might be dumped<br />
under certain conditions (“graylisted” substances) was from the beginning<br />
seen as being of fundamental importance for the convention. Because of the<br />
technical n<strong>at</strong>ure of such decisions, a working group on the annexes, composed<br />
of specialists mainly representing the industrialized countries, was<br />
established. The deliber<strong>at</strong>ions of the working group were l<strong>at</strong>er deb<strong>at</strong>ed in<br />
the general meeting. High-level radioactive waste was alloc<strong>at</strong>ed to the black<br />
list (officially Annex I). This meant a total prohibition on dumping.<br />
Medium-level and low-level radioactive waste were not mentioned. The<br />
inclusion of high-level radioactive waste and “agents of biological and<br />
chemical warfare” in the black list was fiercely contested.<br />
Although the revised U.S. draft convention was silent with respect to<br />
dumping of radioactive waste, it was the position of the United St<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong><br />
such activity should not be regul<strong>at</strong>ed by the future global ocean dumping<br />
convention but instead should remain under the IAEA. 33 In contrast, the