Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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Explaining Regime Change 159<br />
Yet the approach does not separ<strong>at</strong>e, measure, and compare those variables,<br />
and it is accordingly quite likely th<strong>at</strong> the impact of epistemic communities<br />
on intern<strong>at</strong>ional environmental policy has been imprecisely assessed. This<br />
case documents the existence of complex rel<strong>at</strong>ionships of ENGOs, scientific<br />
communities, and governments. These rel<strong>at</strong>ionships should be examined<br />
more carefully.<br />
Obviously, the development of the regime did not reflect scientific opinion,<br />
and ocean scientists criticized it in professional journals. Pointing out<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the 1985 London Convention resolution “totally disregarded” science,<br />
the British geobiochemist E. I. Hamilton wrote (1986, pp. 296–297):<br />
“There is no scientific evidence to indic<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong> the discharge of low level<br />
radioactive wastes to the sea, land or air is harmful to man.” A peerreviewed<br />
1986 article concluded th<strong>at</strong> the risks from past radioactive ocean<br />
dumping in the Northeast Atlantic were “very low indeed” (Camplin and<br />
Hill 1986, p. 250). Thus, making a barely concealed reference to the mor<strong>at</strong>orium<br />
on radwaste disposal, Camplin and Hill wrote: “It is clear th<strong>at</strong> there<br />
are no scientific or technical grounds for excluding sea dumping from consider<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
alongside other viable disposal options for radioactive wastes”<br />
(ibid., p. 251).<br />
Intern<strong>at</strong>ionally acclaimed scientists who served as advisors to the regime<br />
were also critical. The regime’s scientific advisory group, GESAMP (Group<br />
of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, established under<br />
UN auspices in 1969) seriously questioned the wisdom of changing the<br />
regime’s radwaste disposal policy. Members of GESAMP emphasized th<strong>at</strong>,<br />
despite the fact th<strong>at</strong> existing knowledge was imperfect and uncertain, the<br />
consensus of the marine scientific community was th<strong>at</strong> the risk from past<br />
dumping was “exceedingly small” (Bewers and Garrett 1987, p. 118). More<br />
generally, GESAMP described the policy development as an example of<br />
“lack of confidence in the regul<strong>at</strong>ory process” when full environmental<br />
implic<strong>at</strong>ions of waste emissions were not known (GESAMP 1991, p. 10).<br />
GESAMP advised against banning radwaste disposal, but the transn<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
anti-dumping coalition ignored the regime’s scientific advisors, and the scientists<br />
had very little political clout. 12<br />
Specialized UN agencies did not recommend the regime change either.<br />
The IAEA compared risks relevant to ocean dumping of low-level radioactive<br />
waste and reached essentially the same conclusion as GESAMP. An