Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

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Explaining Regime Change 165 First, ENGOs influence regime development by mobilizing public opinion. Public concern makes it politically costly for governments to ignore perceived environmental-protection needs. It can also result in tougher environmental-protection measures. Public opinion raises the political costs of disregarding international environmental regimes; put emphatically, “governments that are reluctant to sign will be pilloried at home.” 18 Mass publicity has been critical for the ENGOs established in the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Hansen 1993, pp. 150–178). Successful public diplomacy depends on mass media effectively communicating powerful images and ideas to policy makers and the general public. “Pollution ideas are,” as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky have pointed out (1983, p. 47), “an instrument of control,” and the essence of effective campaigning is to use powerful metaphors, images and ideas with great effect. “Save the whales,” “the oceans are dying,” and “the ozone hole” are examples of influential images and ideas that have been backed by environmentalists and have played a significant intellectual role in global environmental politics. The availability of powerful public ideas and the deliberate construction of metaphors and symbols of serious environmental damage and crises is essential in public diplomacy. Therefore, in their absence, it is unlikely that ENGOs can sell or market an issue to the public, and there will be little room for persuasion, campaigning, and public diplomacy by ENGOs. Following a similar line of reasoning, scholars who emphasize crises and exogenous shocks expect little progress on issues such as international management of biodiversity and global warming, at least as long as only gradual environmental damage is occurring. 20 A metaphor highlighting demonstrable damage due to global warming (e.g. a “climate hole”) is most likely necessary in order to focus sufficient attention on global warming and persuade governments to act aggressively against this problem (Schneider 1998, p. 18). Greenpeace’s public diplomacy has often been spectacularly effective. By staging spectacular “happenings” or series of focusing events (so-called campaigns), Greenpeace has focused the attention of the international public and mass media on ocean dumping of radioactive waste, nuclear testing, whaling, sealing, oil rig dumping, and other “environmental crimes.” “We want to draw attention to something,” a founder and chairman of Greenpeace explained (Thomas 1984). “We use action and, once there’s attention, we move into lobbying.” Greenpeace is probably the main
166 Chapter 9 “green” influence on international public opinion, but other ENGOs also shape public opinion. Second, ENGOs influence regime development by transnational coalition building. Strong transnational coalitions are built by extending ENGO networks and by adding scientists, special-interest groups, and governments. Special-interest groups affected by environmental deterioration dramatically alter the configuration of interests and significantly strengthen transnational environmental coalitions. It is highly likely that special-interest groups, as opposed to the general public, will be part of a transnational environmental coalition, because those whose health or income are directly affected by environmental deterioration are strongly motivated to act. This is confirmed in many environmental conflicts, including game hunters pressing for protection of elephants and the tourism industry’s protesting against pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. 21 Furthermore, it is of great significance in environmental diplomacy that the number of states in a transnational coalition group be large, as this makes it possible to pass resolutions, moratoriums, and global bans. ENGOs play a significant role in recruiting new members, especially downwind and downstream states, in transnational environmental coalitions. Transnational coalition building, which figures prominently in the case of the radwaste ban, deserves much more attention. As discussed above, some of the recent literature draws attention to the importance of civil society. Though the case of radwaste disposal could be seen as confirming the claim about the political significance of global civil society made by some scholars, it also shows that ENGOs significantly increase their influence on regime development by directly “bringing in” interest groups and civil society actors. Knowledge-based regime analysis pays much attention to transnational networks of scientists, but coalition building among influential special-interest groups (in which ENGOs play a major role) is not yet well understood. Shipbuilders, classification societies, and insurers have been important in creating an effective compliance system for controlling intentional pollution by oil tankers, and in the case of global warming some ENGOs see the insurance industry as an influential interest group to be included in a coalition of interests that can effectively challenge the fossil fuel industry (Mitchell 1994). 22 However, coalitions are not necessarily enduring or stable. At an early stage of international regulation of chlorofluorocarbons (which deplete the atmospheric ozone layer), the chemical
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Global Environmental Accord: Strate
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© 2001 Massachusetts Institute of
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Series Foreword A new recognition o
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x Preface International Climate and
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1 Introduction In this book I seek
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Introduction 3 aimed to identify ca
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Introduction 5 that I document cont
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Introduction 7 may not fit easily i
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Introduction 9 many regime analysts
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Introduction 11 broad range of nons
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Introduction 13 international organ
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Introduction 15 caught my attention
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Introduction 17 my understanding of
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Introduction 19 prohibition even th
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22 Chapter 2 it enters the body, th
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24 Chapter 2 most important being r
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26 Chapter 2 (McDougal and Burke 19
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28 Chapter 2 mainly disposed of in
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30 Chapter 2 In 1983, in response t
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32 Chapter 2 Table 2.3 Status of lo
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34 Chapter 2 In a world searching f
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36 Chapter 3 War, Machiavelli’s T
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38 Chapter 3 of international organ
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40 Chapter 3 constructed. For examp
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42 Chapter 3 order to pave the way
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44 Chapter 3 It seems quite plausib
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46 Chapter 3 constrained to take ca
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48 Chapter 3 change. For instance,
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50 Chapter 3 involving large number
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52 Chapter 3 begin.” The consumer
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54 Chapter 3 advocate policies only
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56 Chapter 3 for a regime that refl
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4 Scientific Advice and Ocean Dumpi
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Knowledge-Based Regime Analysis 61
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5 Ocean Dumping and U.S Domestic Po
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 75 seri
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 77 Grou
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 79 the
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 81 said
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 83 be t
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 85 Poll
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6 Negotiating the Global Ocean Dump
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 89 e
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 91 S
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 93 c
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 95 1
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 97 v
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7 Explaining Regime Formation Build
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Explaining Regime Formation 111 ori
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Explaining Regime Formation 113 dem
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Page 184 and 185: 10 Conclusion Since the 1960s a num
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Page 192 and 193: Conclusion 179 nalized by other soc
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Page 196 and 197: Conclusion 183 likely to be influen
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Page 200 and 201: Looking Back and Looking Ahead Conc
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Page 209 and 210: 196 Key Events 1993 Results of stud
Page 211 and 212: 198 Notes to pp. 5-18 12. The Conve
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216 Notes to pp. 97-100 ecological
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218 Notes to pp. 106-115 42. On the
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220 Notes to pp. 122-127 the Pacifi
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222 Notes to pp. 134-135 Draft Envi
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224 Notes to pp. 140-145 36. Hollis
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226 Notes to pp. 150-158 73. See LC
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228 Notes to pp. 165-182 19. “The
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230 Notes to pp. 189-192 24. The LC
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232 References Birnie, Patricia W.,
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234 References Cooper, Richard N. 1
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236 References Finnemore, Martha, a
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238 References Haas, Peter M. 1990a
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240 References Jervis, R. 1976. Per
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242 References LDC. 1983b. Critical
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244 References Miles, Edward L. 198
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246 References Pearson, Charles S.
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248 References Rosenau, James N. 19
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250 References Spiller, Judith, and
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252 References U.S. Senate. 1971. O
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Interviews Cited Aarkrog, Asker, He
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258 Index Environmental nongovernme
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260 Index Oceanic Society, 135 Ocea
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