Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

118 Chapter 7
Interest-Based Regime Analysis
It conforms well to the interest-based approach that the United States took
the lead when the global dumping regime was built. However, the hegemon
did not make use of its superior material resources, nor did any individual
representing the hegemon act as an outstanding entrepreneurial leader.
Rather, as was pointed out above, the United States’ leadership strategy
relied on persuasion. The United States wanted to set a good example for
others to follow—a form of leadership that is distinguishable from structural,
entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership.
Unilateral action demonstrating determination and showing that national
policy priority is given to solving a collective problem clearly has a demonstration
value and is rightly understood to be a means of persuasion. Yet
many neoliberals would doubt that a state might provide leadership in
regime formation by going first and by behaving in an exemplary fashion.
One exception is Arild Underdal, who observes (1994, p. 185) that “unilateral
action may provide leadership . . . through social mechanisms,
notably as a means of persuasion. Particularly in situations characterized by
high problem similarity, unilateral action may be used for demonstrating
that a certain cure is indeed feasible or does work, or to set a good example
for others to follow.” Underdal concludes that “the persuasive impact
of unilateral actions depends primarily not on its actual impact but rather
on the amount of uncertainty removed [about an actor’s motives and strategies]
or on its moral force and symbolic significance” (ibid., p. 185). 11 These
observations are most pertinent in the present case, but persuasion understood
as a social mechanism and the moral and symbolic power of state
behavior are not significant research issues in interest-based regime analysis,
nor are they well integrated in its research program. For example, Keohane
(1984, p. 53) claims that strategies relying on persuasion and the force of
good examples are less effective in achieving cooperation than strategies
involving threats and punishments as well as promises and rewards. 12 The
role of processes of persuasion and communicative action are, however,
fundamental issues in the ideational approach to political analysis.
Rationalists generally expect large groups to reach agreement only with
great difficulty. Collective action theorists posit that a large group of governments
encourages governments to free ride because the group will provide
the collective good despite free riders who therefore are not strongly