Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

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Conclusion 181 It should also be acknowledged, although attention was paid to the pollution control or abatement costs of ocean dumping regulation, that the costs of environmental regulation did not attract as much attention in the early 1970s as they did later. Other studies confirm that relatively little attention was paid to costs of environmental protection in the early 1970s. 6 Governments and the private sector have learned since then that environmental regulation, which in an early stage might appear innocuous, may later turn out to be costly. On the one hand, this could make states less likely to cooperate if they believed that cooperation was unacceptably costly and that the environmental-protection benefits did not justify the pollution-control costs. On the other hand, however, harmonizing the cost of environmental policy and environmental regulation across countries is often an important driving force behind international environmental policy coordination. 7 As was explained in chapter 1, this study focused on radwaste disposal because the emerging controversy around this issue made it a significant and fascinating case study. How we choose to dispose of our radioactive waste is an issue of paramount environmental significance. Furthermore, the radwaste disposal issue was of great significance for the functioning of the regime, a fact which also made it an appealing research topic. In addition to low-level radioactive waste, the global ocean dumping regime deals with a number of other waste forms and disposal forms (e.g., incineration at sea). Though the analysis of the regime-formation process covered all substances regulated under this regime, it could be seen as a limitation that the study of the regime transformation process focused exclusively on radwaste disposal. Although this is to some extent true, this limitation could be remedied by comparing the results of this study with studies examining other substances regulated under this regime. The public, political leaders, and ENGOs perceive radioactive waste and other aspects of nuclear technology mostly negatively. 8 What does this mean for the generalizability of the findings? It means that some caution is called for. It should be expected that policy entrepreneurs could quite easily persuade the public that ocean disposal of radwaste is a horrid anti-environmental activity. Because international public opinion is likely to perceive radwaste disposal negatively, mobilizing domestic and international antidumping sentiments would be reasonably straightforward for an influential global ENGO. But it would be very hard to convince the general public
182 Chapter 10 that sea disposal is an environmentally neutral and safe, and perhaps even an environmentally preferable, disposal option for this radioactive waste. 9 It might be argued that the circumscribed role of the regime’s scientific expertise is a reflection of the public’s fear of radioactivity. Examination of other international environmental issues might conclude that international public opinion sometimes is a weak source of influence. Public opinion, national and international, may also be divided on and even inattentive to particular issues. 10 Nevertheless, as I have suggested in this book, whether this is the case or not will to a significant degree depend on transnational policy entrepreneurship and the availability of ideas, images, and metaphors able to attract public and political attention. It should be pointed out, finally, that the radwaste disposal issue polarized countries into basically two groups: a large anti-dumping group and a much smaller but materially powerful pro-dumping group. This issue therefore created a particular dynamic that could explain the political attractiveness of moratoriums and bans. This is not unimportant in understanding the dynamics of this issue, but it cannot fully explain the international policy development in regard to radwaste disposal. Recommendations for Research I have not claimed in this book that power in the material sense and interests are insignificant in regime development, nor that only ideational factors matter. From an ideational point of view, interests and power clearly matter; however, they cannot alone explain the content of specific policies. It is insufficient to show that a policy satisfies interests; policies have also a cognitive content. At the same time, ideas and theories alone are not powerful enough themselves to determine policy development, and ideational analysis should therefore not be seen as an alternative to approaches emphasizing power and interests. The analytical ambition of regime theory should be to integrate ideas and interests, rather than to segregate them. By focusing on the role of ideas, it is possible to develop auxiliary hypotheses that supplement well established theories about how power and interests influence regime development. It is necessary to carefully examine how, when, and why ideas matter in environmental cooperation and environmental regime development. I have sought to identify with more precision the conditions under which ideas are
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Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea P
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Global Environmental Accord: Strate
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© 2001 Massachusetts Institute of
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Series Foreword A new recognition o
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x Preface International Climate and
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1 Introduction In this book I seek
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Introduction 3 aimed to identify ca
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Introduction 5 that I document cont
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Introduction 7 may not fit easily i
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Introduction 9 many regime analysts
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Introduction 11 broad range of nons
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Introduction 13 international organ
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Introduction 15 caught my attention
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Introduction 17 my understanding of
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Introduction 19 prohibition even th
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22 Chapter 2 it enters the body, th
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24 Chapter 2 most important being r
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26 Chapter 2 (McDougal and Burke 19
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28 Chapter 2 mainly disposed of in
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30 Chapter 2 In 1983, in response t
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32 Chapter 2 Table 2.3 Status of lo
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34 Chapter 2 In a world searching f
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36 Chapter 3 War, Machiavelli’s T
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38 Chapter 3 of international organ
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40 Chapter 3 constructed. For examp
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42 Chapter 3 order to pave the way
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44 Chapter 3 It seems quite plausib
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46 Chapter 3 constrained to take ca
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48 Chapter 3 change. For instance,
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50 Chapter 3 involving large number
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52 Chapter 3 begin.” The consumer
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54 Chapter 3 advocate policies only
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56 Chapter 3 for a regime that refl
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4 Scientific Advice and Ocean Dumpi
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Knowledge-Based Regime Analysis 61
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5 Ocean Dumping and U.S Domestic Po
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 75 seri
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 77 Grou
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 79 the
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 81 said
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 83 be t
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Power-Based Regime Analysis 85 Poll
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6 Negotiating the Global Ocean Dump
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 89 e
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 91 S
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 93 c
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 95 1
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 97 v
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 99 s
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Interest-Based Regime Analysis 101
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7 Explaining Regime Formation Build
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Explaining Regime Formation 111 ori
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Explaining Regime Formation 113 dem
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Explaining Regime Formation 115 Tim
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Explaining Regime Formation 117 Pow
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Explaining Regime Formation 119 mot
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Explaining Regime Formation 121 tri
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Explaining Regime Formation 123 blo
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Explaining Regime Formation 125 enc
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Explaining Regime Formation 127 At
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Explaining Regime Formation 129 inp
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Page 172 and 173: Explaining Regime Change 159 Yet th
Page 174 and 175: Explaining Regime Change 161 to tha
Page 176 and 177: Explaining Regime Change 163 Schola
Page 178 and 179: Explaining Regime Change 165 First,
Page 180 and 181: Explaining Regime Change 167 compan
Page 182 and 183: Explaining Regime Change 169 al. 19
Page 184 and 185: 10 Conclusion Since the 1960s a num
Page 186 and 187: Conclusion 173 mon, moreover, the U
Page 188 and 189: Conclusion 175 entrepreneurs, in co
Page 190 and 191: Conclusion 177 nomic arrangements o
Page 192 and 193: Conclusion 179 nalized by other soc
Page 196 and 197: Conclusion 183 likely to be influen
Page 198 and 199: Conclusion 185 sidered of paramount
Page 200 and 201: Looking Back and Looking Ahead Conc
Page 202 and 203: Conclusion 189 importance of agreei
Page 204 and 205: Conclusion 191 social and economic
Page 206: Conclusion 193 costly and unwise so
Page 209 and 210: 196 Key Events 1993 Results of stud
Page 211 and 212: 198 Notes to pp. 5-18 12. The Conve
Page 213 and 214: 200 Notes to pp. 25-30 13. Informat
Page 215 and 216: 202 Notes to pp. 35-42 2. On policy
Page 217 and 218: 204 Notes to pp. 46-51 31. For exam
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Page 221 and 222: 208 Notes to pp. 67-74 27. See P. H
Page 223 and 224: 210 Notes to pp. 75-78 10. See also
Page 225 and 226: 212 Notes to pp. 82-83 September 9,
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Page 229 and 230: 216 Notes to pp. 97-100 ecological
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Page 233 and 234: 220 Notes to pp. 122-127 the Pacifi
Page 235 and 236: 222 Notes to pp. 134-135 Draft Envi
Page 237 and 238: 224 Notes to pp. 140-145 36. Hollis
Page 239 and 240: 226 Notes to pp. 150-158 73. See LC
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Page 243 and 244: 230 Notes to pp. 189-192 24. The LC
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232 References Birnie, Patricia W.,
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234 References Cooper, Richard N. 1
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236 References Finnemore, Martha, a
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238 References Haas, Peter M. 1990a
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240 References Jervis, R. 1976. Per
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242 References LDC. 1983b. Critical
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244 References Miles, Edward L. 198
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246 References Pearson, Charles S.
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248 References Rosenau, James N. 19
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250 References Spiller, Judith, and
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252 References U.S. Senate. 1971. O
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Interviews Cited Aarkrog, Asker, He
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258 Index Environmental nongovernme
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260 Index Oceanic Society, 135 Ocea
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