Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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56 Chapter 3<br />
for a regime th<strong>at</strong> reflected its perception of the scope of this problem. Those<br />
countries in which the epistemic community had access to domestic decision<br />
makers would be the strongest supporters of stringent controls on ocean<br />
dumping. Conversely, those countries in which it had limited or no access<br />
to domestic decision makers would be the weakest supporters of stringent<br />
controls on ocean dumping.<br />
Although Haas focuses on the role of knowledge and new inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
when explaining why Mediterranean st<strong>at</strong>es complied with and expanded<br />
the Med Plan, he actually points to erroneous beliefs instead of scientific<br />
knowledge when he explains the establishment of the regime: “Many<br />
[n<strong>at</strong>ional] officials thought th<strong>at</strong> pollution was a commons problem, and<br />
thus required coordin<strong>at</strong>ed action throughout the region. They assumed th<strong>at</strong><br />
currents transferred the pollutants fairly freely among countries. UNEP officials<br />
were well aware th<strong>at</strong> currents were not sufficiently strong to transmit<br />
pollutants across the Mediterranean Basin . . . but they hoped to complete<br />
an agreement, so they just smiled and nodded when others characterized<br />
Mediterranean pollution as a commons problem. . . . This false perception<br />
actually facilit<strong>at</strong>ed the resolution of the problem.” (Haas 1990a, pp. 70–71)<br />
Paradoxically, therefore, persuasion by an ecological epistemic community<br />
apparently was not necessary in bringing decision makers to begin controlling<br />
regional pollution.<br />
Elsewhere, Haas briefly mentions th<strong>at</strong> “Jacques Cousteau was active in<br />
<strong>at</strong>tracting publicity” to Mediterranean pollution, and th<strong>at</strong> “gloom-anddoom<br />
prophesies” produced widespread concern about the st<strong>at</strong>e of health<br />
of the Mediterranean in the early 1970s (1990a, pp. 83, 104). Moreover,<br />
Haas occasionally juxtaposes the influence of popular science and hard science<br />
in his explan<strong>at</strong>ions. He writes, for example: “An ecological epistemic<br />
community was consulted by governments in order to dispel uncertainty<br />
about the extent of environmental pollution. Such concern was precipit<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
by a crisis; the alarm th<strong>at</strong> the Mediterranean was in danger of dying.” (ibid.,<br />
p. 224) Yet, the fact th<strong>at</strong> prominent scientists and ecologists together with<br />
popular science accounts of Mediterranean pollution identified the need<br />
for regional environmental cooper<strong>at</strong>ion is not taken into account by the<br />
epistemic-community approach. 57<br />
To cre<strong>at</strong>e the global ocean dumping regime, the epistemic-community analyst<br />
would expect th<strong>at</strong> an ecological epistemic community would supply<br />
intern<strong>at</strong>ional leadership. Domestic decision makers would be uncertain