Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

218 Notes to pp. 106–115
42. On the “double standards,” see Timagenis 1980, pp. 77–79 and 178. Developing
countries’ concerns similarly underlie principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration.
It reads: “Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the
international community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally,
it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in
each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for
the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
social cost for the developing countries.” (reprinted in Rowland 1973, p. 145)
43. The technical working group produced the following text: “High-level radioactive
wastes defined as unsuitable including the ecological viewpoint for dumping at
sea, by the competent international body in this field.” (“Report of Technical
Working Party,” DWS(T)7 1st Revise (3 November 1972), p. 2)
44. See DWS(T)7 1st Revise, p. 5.
45. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Annex I, item 6 in ILM 11 (November 1972), p. 1310.
46. See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Annex II, item D in ibid., p. 1311.
47. The clause itself was a strong reason why states were willing to conclude the
negotiations.
48. Because of the unsettled German issue and the refusal to the GDR of diplomatic
recognition, the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries, with the
exception of Rumania, were absent from the Stockholm conference.
49. House Report no. 361, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1971 (92nd Congress, 1st session) (1971), p. 14.
Chapter 7
1. The emphasis on scientific consensus in the epistemic communities literature is
also noted on p. 12 of Litfin 1994.
2. For a study of American environmental leaders and prominent science celebrities
enjoying intense mass media coverage in the 1960s and the 1970s, see Goodell 1975.
3. See, e.g., Litfin 1994, p. 32.
4. For a similar critique, see Risse-Kappen 1994, p. 187.
5. It is not unusual for the building of an international regime to take 20 years or
more. See Levy et al. 1995, p. 280.
6. A short decision time is likely to increase the demand for leadership in international
negotiations. See Underdal 1994, p. 183.
7. For the full text of Train’s statement, see Treaty Information: London Conference
Agrees on Ocean Dumping Convention, Department of State Bulletin, December
18, 1972, pp. 710–711.
8. For an inductive approach to the interpretation of the national interest, see
Krasner 1978, pp. 42–45.