Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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46 Chapter 3<br />
constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system.” 29 A<br />
strong emphasis on how the intern<strong>at</strong>ional system forces st<strong>at</strong>es to protect<br />
their n<strong>at</strong>ional interests and to ignore common interests pervades realism<br />
and power-based theory.<br />
In the realist view, st<strong>at</strong>es are trapped in a st<strong>at</strong>ic situ<strong>at</strong>ion out of which<br />
only a major change of the intern<strong>at</strong>ional system can bring them. According<br />
to Waltz (ibid., p. 108), “st<strong>at</strong>es facing global problems are like individual<br />
consumers trapped by the ‘tyranny of small decisions’”:<br />
St<strong>at</strong>es, like consumers, can get out of the trap only by changing the structure of<br />
their field of activity. The message bears repe<strong>at</strong>ing: The only remedy for a strong<br />
structural effect is a structural change.<br />
The phrase “tyranny of small decisions” refers to collectively unwanted<br />
consequences of individuals’ behavior. A prominent example would be the<br />
“tragedy of the commons.” 30 Numerous examples exist of how society and<br />
other “groups” may dislike the aggreg<strong>at</strong>e results of behavior th<strong>at</strong> on the<br />
level of the individual seems r<strong>at</strong>ional (Schelling 1978).<br />
Realists assert th<strong>at</strong> the anarchic structure of the intern<strong>at</strong>ional system—a<br />
result of absence of a government, a police force, and a judicial power—<br />
makes n<strong>at</strong>ions constantly worry about their survival. In their view, the intern<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
system is a self-help system th<strong>at</strong> severely constrains governments’<br />
ability to cooper<strong>at</strong>e (Waltz 1986, pp. 101–104). Two principal obstacles to<br />
all cooper<strong>at</strong>ion follow from this: “A st<strong>at</strong>e worries about a division of possible<br />
gains th<strong>at</strong> may favor others more than itself. . . . A st<strong>at</strong>e also worries<br />
lest it become dependent on others through cooper<strong>at</strong>ive endeavors and<br />
exchanges of goods and services.” (ibid., pp. 102–103)<br />
Following the realist approach, st<strong>at</strong>es would cooper<strong>at</strong>e within the global<br />
ocean dumping regime only to the extent th<strong>at</strong> doing so would improve, or<br />
<strong>at</strong> least maintain, their position rel<strong>at</strong>ive to other st<strong>at</strong>es. St<strong>at</strong>es would not<br />
cooper<strong>at</strong>e if the regime weakened their position rel<strong>at</strong>ive to other st<strong>at</strong>es.<br />
Realists would suspect th<strong>at</strong> developing countries generally would be reluctant<br />
about particip<strong>at</strong>ing in the regime. Because of their poor economic conditions,<br />
power theorists would expect developing countries not to spend<br />
their scarce economic resources on environmental protection and pollution<br />
control technologies. 31 For similar reasons, it seems very unlikely from a<br />
realist viewpoint th<strong>at</strong> developing countries would implement stringent<br />
intern<strong>at</strong>ional environmental legisl<strong>at</strong>ion, because th<strong>at</strong> would retard their<br />
much needed industrial and economic development.