Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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Transn<strong>at</strong>ional Coalitions 53<br />
Haas (1980, p. 357) links regime cre<strong>at</strong>ion to perception of costs of no<br />
cooper<strong>at</strong>ion: “The need for collabor<strong>at</strong>ion arises from the recognition th<strong>at</strong><br />
the costs of n<strong>at</strong>ional self-reliance are usually excessive.” Knowledge must<br />
be r<strong>at</strong>her consensual, however, in order to guide regime cre<strong>at</strong>ion (ibid., pp.<br />
364–367). 51 Since knowledge varies over time, reflectivists doubt th<strong>at</strong> certain<br />
forms of cooper<strong>at</strong>ion by definition provide collective goods (ibid., p.<br />
360).<br />
Reflectivists do generally not consider hegemonic power a sufficient condition<br />
for regime cre<strong>at</strong>ion and maintenance (E. Haas 1980, p. 359). 52 It is<br />
unlikely, they believe, th<strong>at</strong> the hegemon will supply the necessary power in<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ions where it does not see the need for cre<strong>at</strong>ing collabor<strong>at</strong>ive arrangements<br />
(ibid., p. 365). This might happen when those involved <strong>at</strong> the domestic<br />
level do not support cooper<strong>at</strong>ion, are unable to reach agreement among<br />
themselves, or miscalcul<strong>at</strong>e the outcomes and benefits of cooper<strong>at</strong>ion. 53 On<br />
the other hand, cooper<strong>at</strong>ion is helped to the extent governments are guided<br />
by embedded norms stressing the existence of a commonly shared problem<br />
and the appropri<strong>at</strong>e solutions. 54 Intern<strong>at</strong>ional organiz<strong>at</strong>ions may play a<br />
major role as producers and distributors of new scientific knowledge. But<br />
regimes arise and change through interactions among governments, leaving<br />
little influence to other actors (for example, intern<strong>at</strong>ional organiz<strong>at</strong>ions,<br />
individual leaders, and ENGOs). Downplaying the role of hegemons, Haas<br />
(ibid., p. 370) generalizes th<strong>at</strong> “regimes are constructed by st<strong>at</strong>es through<br />
the medium of multil<strong>at</strong>eral negoti<strong>at</strong>ion.”<br />
When, then, do regimes change? Reflectivists agree th<strong>at</strong> changes of<br />
regimes are mainly results of change of knowledge affecting how the n<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
interest is defined: “If we adopt this perceptual notion of the n<strong>at</strong>ional interest,<br />
we must discard the idea of “structurally necessary” regimes; nothing is<br />
absolutely necessary. . . . Wh<strong>at</strong> was considered necessary in one epistemological<br />
perspective becomes obsolete in another.” (ibid., p. 392)<br />
To understand the evolution and change in governments’ perception of<br />
cooper<strong>at</strong>ion, reflective scholars focus much on how scientists and policy<br />
experts influence policy. They stress th<strong>at</strong> professional groups (in particular,<br />
those within which scientists and experts interact) may, by way of academic<br />
training and professional experiences, acquire a common outlook on the<br />
world, and may even share political values. Similarities exist between epistemic<br />
communities and issue networks, policy communities, and policy subsystems,<br />
but reflectivists argue th<strong>at</strong> an epistemic community chooses to