Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO
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154 Chapter 9<br />
with messages of support from individuals and organiz<strong>at</strong>ions around the<br />
world, including Jacques Cousteau, the mayors of towns and cities along<br />
the French and Spanish Atlantic seaboard, scientific groups, environmentalists<br />
and seafarers’ unions. . . . It is ironic th<strong>at</strong> it has taken a successful act<br />
of defiance against Government policy by three unions to protect Britain’s<br />
good name in the intern<strong>at</strong>ional maritime community.” (Sl<strong>at</strong>er 1983) With<br />
the 1983 mor<strong>at</strong>orium resolution signaling the turning point, intern<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
public opinion no longer accepted ocean dumping of radioactive m<strong>at</strong>erials.<br />
In the eyes of the public, the previous policy had lost its legitimacy.<br />
Greenpeace was also influential in the next stage of regime change. In the<br />
period 1983–1985, it pressured governments to refrain from radwaste<br />
dumping, and it mobilized stakeholders and interest groups. Greenpeace<br />
linked the domestic level and the regime level in a number of effective ways.<br />
By p<strong>at</strong>rolling the oceans on the lookout for dumping ships, it cre<strong>at</strong>ed a sort<br />
of monitoring of and forced compliance with the regime. As was described<br />
in chapter 8, it instantly communic<strong>at</strong>ed inform<strong>at</strong>ion about the 1993<br />
Russian nuclear dumping in the <strong>Sea</strong> of Japan to the Japanese government,<br />
which immedi<strong>at</strong>ely reversed its policy on the issue. By exposing breaks of<br />
regime rules, Greenpeace increased the political costs of noncompliance by<br />
st<strong>at</strong>es. Moreover, Greenpeace coupled interest groups <strong>at</strong> the domestic level<br />
with those <strong>at</strong> the regime level. Through its recruitment of the British trade<br />
unions in 1983, it successfully forged an alliance with domestic actors in<br />
order to pressure a recalcitrant government to comply with intern<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
environmental rules. The British seamen had regime interests and urged the<br />
British government to comply with the rulings of the dumping regime. To<br />
build European opposition to radwaste disposal, Greenpeace also mobilized<br />
the Spanish opposition to nuclear ocean dumping. Opposition to radwaste<br />
disposal was increasingly transn<strong>at</strong>ionally organized, and protests and<br />
boycotts intensified dram<strong>at</strong>ically. While the Greenpeace campaign increased<br />
public pressure on the British government to halt the dumping, it also<br />
increased public pressure on the Spanish government to protest against the<br />
dumping. Greenpeace was a skillful and resourceful two-level player within<br />
the regime. 1<br />
Though combining a powerful public idea with n<strong>at</strong>ional and intern<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
entrepreneurship was crucial, it should be acknowledged th<strong>at</strong> connections<br />
to domestic electoral policies and special circumstances were<br />
crucial too. 2 The British Prime Minister, Margaret Th<strong>at</strong>cher, was already