Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

Interest-Based Regime Analysis 107
Negotiators felt that high international expectations put on their shoulders
by the Stockholm conference pressured them to solve outstanding jurisdictional
issues from earlier meetings. One U.S. negotiator explained that
the fact that “everyone was anxious to complete an effective Convention”
resulted in a clause 47 which stated that the convention would not prejudice
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
which was to begin in 1973 (Leitzell 1973, p. 512). A second U.S. negotiator
pointed out that keen attention by the press had had a decisive influence
on the final outcome: “Ultimately, the text of an agreement was
initialed by representatives of 61 nations, but only after the newspapers had
reported, accurately enough, that negotiations were on the verge of bitter
collapse, and only after the conference was extended for three days.”
(McManus 1973, p. 29) The Danish delegation report emphasized the
weight of international expectations and newly emerging international
norms for environmental protection: “That the negotiations—in spite of
all difficulties—were concluded with a signed draft of convention is
undoubtedly due to the fact that all participants—also the Soviet Union—
felt committed by the recommendations and declarations of the Stockholm
conference, whose first concrete result has now manifested itself.” (memo,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, December 6, 1972, p. 23, translated
by L. Ringius) 48
Conclusions
It conforms well to the neoliberal approach that the United States played
an important role when countries decided to cooperate globally on ocean
dumping control. The United States took the initiative in this issue area
and suggested establishment of a global regime. But, as this chapter also
showed, the construction of this environmental regime does not confirm
neoliberal propositions about hegemonic power and leadership. The hegemon
did not link issues in order to facilitate agreement, nor did it use side
payments to attract less enthusiastic states. Rather, as detailed in the previous
chapter, U.S. leadership was based on willingness to “take the first
steps” to deal with the problem. 49 Significantly, the United States and
Britain failed to dictate the regulatory arrangement for radioactive waste,
an issue that was dealt with as part of a more comprehensive negotiation
package.