Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea: Public Ideas ... - IMO

204 Notes to pp. 46–51
31. For example, an official from the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
noted that “in developing countries, the conflicts [“between any obligation to prevent
pollution of the marine environment and the effects of implementing that obligation
on economic development”] are far more intense because the options open
for economic development are limited” (Kirton 1977, p. 280).
32. Grieco (1990, p. 10) has emphasized that states are primarily concerned about
their physical survival and their political independence. Snidal (1991) has challenged
the realist claim that states worry about how well they fare compared to other states
(relative gains), and not simply how well they fare themselves (absolute gains).
33. For example, in April of 1977 the Carter administration decided to defer commercial
reprocessing of nuclear waste indefinitely because of the feared risk of proliferation
of nuclear weapons. See Power 1979.
34. See Keohane 1980, pp. 131–162.
35. On benevolent and coercive hegemonic leaders, see Hasenclever et al. 1997,
pp. 90–95.
36. Grieco (1990, p. 10) has emphasized the Waltzian view on cooperation claiming
that such bargains would not take place: “. . . a relative-gains problem for cooperation
[exists]: a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its
commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in otherwise mutually
positive gains favor partners.” For a recent discussion, see Snidal 1991 and
Powell 1991. For a critical discussion of Grieco’s view, see Milner 1992.
37. For the definition of mixed-motive games, see Schelling 1960, p. 89.
38. See, e.g., Keohane’s discussion of bounded rationality and incomplete and partially
available information (1984, pp. 110–116).
39. On the games Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken, see Oye 1986, pp.
1–24. See also Axelrod and Keohane 1986, pp. 228–232.
40. Realists, however, doubt that the “shadow of the future” necessarily makes
cooperation more likely. See Grieco 1990, p. 227.
41. On N-person games, see Snidal 1986, pp. 52–55. On the significance of the
number of actors, see Snidal 1995.
42. On the benevolent effects of institutions’ transforming N-person games into
collections of two-person games, see Axelrod and Keohane 1986, pp. 237–239.
43. On issue density, see Keohane 1984, pp. 79–80.
44. See, e.g., Keohane 1984, pp. 78–80. Those who stress that hegemons act on
selfish reasons when they provide public goods build upon Olson’s (1965, pp.
33–34) argument about “privileged groups.”
45. Keohane’s (1984) functional theory of international regimes explains regimes
as means at the disposal of states wanting to cooperate. On functional explanations,
see Elster 1983, pp. 49–68.
46. On focal points, see Schelling 1960, p. 70.
47. See Young 1991.
48. See Young 1989, pp. 373–374; Young 1991, pp. 302–305.