1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

gold holdings, so the West pumped in more money. Kennan’s view was that there was
utility for particular covert actions like this one in Italy and France. He believed that
covert actions could be used in particular circumstances, and that covert intelligence
efforts should then be organized upon the basis of immediate real need, that the
capabilities to do so should be in place, if not, covert action should not be used. He was
speaking mostly about the covert action structures, not analysis and collection. Kennan
believed each covert action’s structures should be disbanded after use. In his view, covert
action structures were too dangerous to leave in place.
His sense of the quality of intelligence was – and this was a general view, because the
technical material was very good and not obtainable in any other way. The human
intelligence was only rarely useful, and that was my sense of things, too, having gone
through almost all of it. For example, the Penkovsky papers, much celebrated, had very
little utility in the end.
Q: He was a Soviet general who was at the Kremlin.
MILLER: Who turned over tactical battle details, but on examination, while it was highly
classified secret material, no doubt, and it did tell details of deployments, the knowledge
gained didn't make any difference. It certainly wasn't worth lives, and that this was one of
the problems of such forms of espionage. The Penkovsky case was daring and exciting,
but courage and utility are not the same thing.
Q: Well, was there any look at the practice, which, I don't know, may still continue, and
that is of the stations in our various embassies almost seem to get credit for recruiting
people, which means putting people of foreign nationality, particularly in positions of
importance, on the CIA payroll, which can, one, be counterproductive, as found out, and,
two, often if they do this, then these people are declared off-limits to the State
Department, who would be their normal contacts?
MILLER: That was and is a constant issue. Most informed judgments about this, come
from the best of the Foreign Service and the intelligence community, as well. This is a
matter for the ambassador to decide, to govern. If the ambassador is strong enough and
wise enough, experienced enough, he decides. Ambassadorial control in the field was
where the committee came out at the end of the investigation. The conclusion was
confirmed in a presidential order that said the ambassador is in charge of all operations in
his country, including intelligence and military, the only exception being the activities of
the CINCS in theatre operations.
Q: That's the overall military commander in the area, where you're talking about troops
in the field.
MILLER: Talking about divisions in the field, armies. But anything within his country of
jurisdiction, the ambassador had to know about, and has primary responsibility for. When
I went to Ukraine as ambassador, that was the case. The agency declared everything it
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