1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

Kravchuk and the Ukrainian leadership could be believed or not, and I said, "This is a
good, acceptable deal," and they were skeptical in Washington. They had to come out and
see it for themselves on the ground. And even then, when they came, they were dealing
with this difficulty of negotiations with people like Kravchuk and Buteyko and Tarasyuk,
who were very suspicious, resentful, defensive, protective, thin skinned, very close to
their dignities and we, as representatives of a confident nation, are impatient, and as
leaders of a great power we sometimes behave arrogantly, and with little or no
magnanimity. Clinton was a personal exception. Clinton was magnificent all the time,
because he understood this feeling of uncertainty on the part of the Ukrainians and was
decisive in very important moments by saying and conveying the feeling that, "I'm with
you, I'm with you," they got the point.
Clinton further conveyed his own sense of how to approach and talk to the Ukrainians, to
his key aides, his advisers and his cabinet officers. He said that that's the approach he
wanted. This was the way he saw it, and they responded accordingly. So, from the point
of view of presidential help, for me, I couldn't be more grateful than I am for Clinton's
substantive help. He was terrific in substance, and particularly the handling of
psychological attitude. He knew what was needed. He was absolutely brilliant. I marveled
at how good he was at this important quality of empathy.
Q: Well, were the Russians trying to screw this up by having their officers sitting on these
missiles or not?
MILLER: I think they were trying to hold on to the control of the missiles. But the
Ukrainians had moved so decisively, first to surround, to ring all of the missile silos with
their own troops. They guarded every silo with Ukrainians who had sworn allegiance to
the new Ukraine, and were serving under Ukrainian generals; speaking in the Ukrainians
language; it was a constructive coup, really, with the Soviet 43 rd Rocket Army
commander taking the oath as an Ukrainian; so the apparatus, the line of military
command, from top to bottom became Ukrainian.
Q: Well, then, were the people we sent out there to supervise this, did you have to make
sure that they were aware of sensitivities and all?
MILLER: Sure, but those who were sent to Ukraine were good. I have to say that the help
from the Pentagon, what became CTR (Cooperative Threat Reduction) – that's threat
reduction program – the Nunn-Lugar, were thoughtful, constructive, and were real pros.
They had taken advantage of all the work that had been done over decades. They were
extremely responsible and careful. I made sure that they didn't go anywhere into the
missile fields until they had briefed me first about what they were going to do, and how,
and with whom. The DOD, CTR delegations always were required when they came to
Ukraine for their two weeks or month consultations, to brief me in full before and after
their missions, with authorizing documents and reports. I also went to all the nuclear
weapons sites. For example, I was the first American to go inside the Soviet rocket
factory, the former Soviet rocket factory in Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd.
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