1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

diminished, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was perceived and treated by us as a
great power, and that Ukraine was not a great power. So the assertion that Ukraine would
be treated fairly and justly was something that had to be proved. The Ukrainians had deep
doubts that we would treat Ukraine fairly and with dignity. Ukrainian leaders believed
that long service in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, by our foreign policy experts was
operating against Ukraine. So what we did to counter this sense of insecurity was - Strobe
and Jim Collins and others made this work - the White House, NCSC advisor Tony Lake
and most importantly, the president - was that every visit that was made to Moscow, there
would also be a stop in Kyiv. The President or other high officials would either start in
Kyiv or end up in Kyiv. So, every official that went to the former Soviet Union, and there
were almost weekly cabinet officer visits, was in that framework of this two track policy.
It was what I recommended. It was what Strobe and the president believed in, and we
carried it out, and it was very effective.
Q: I would think so.
MILLER: It was pragmatic evidence of our intent.
Q: Do we have any problems with Belarus or Moldova or the 'stans, or anything like
Georgia?
MILLER: Yes, there were problems of that character, the character you described. Yes,
and the difficulty is you can't be everywhere enough of the time, and the decision was,
Ukraine was the big one. But in the case of Belarus, the independence movement of
democratic nationalists was very weak; it collapsed very quickly. It was very difficult for
our ambassadors there to do anything.
Q: I mean, was that a problem for you, that things were not going well there?
MILLER: No, no, it wasn't a problem in the dealings I had on policy matters with
Ukraine, not at all. The contrast between what was happening in Belarus as compared to
Ukraine was so great that Ukraine seemed like a model of progress in comparison. They
came to stay with me a number of times, just to get out of the place. They were having an
awful time. They were being badly treated by what eventually became the Lukashenko
dictatorship, and even the ambassador’s residence was held hostage. They had to bear up
under all sorts of petty, horrible things. It was a nasty, nasty situation, but it was very
clear from early on that the dominant party of power in Belarus wanted to remain with
Russia. The size of the opposition was much smaller than the groups who wanted to be a
part of Russia.
Q: Well, now, in the Ukraine, to follow through on the missile problem, were you getting
an equivocation when you said, "Okay, I'm willing to do this, but they need financial help
and that sort of thing?"
MILLER: No, the initial rejection or doubt from Washington concerned whether
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