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social revolutionary change. The changes brought about by perestroika were the highest
form of socialism, you might say, because it was so social that you would go everywhere,
concerts, then to people’s houses, move from one house to another, and go off to the
dacha (cottage) and never stop talking or stop developing new ideas and projects.
Q: By the time you got there, had things reached a pass? I’m told, a little earlier on, by
people who served in Poland, who said that they were convinced there must be maybe
four dedicated Marxists in the whole country. Had the Soviets – really the Russians we’re
talking about – had they pretty well shucked Marx’s ideology or was this still a major
theme?
MILLER: It was still a major belief. Marxism was still deeply held. The Gorbachevian
proposition was that Marxism could be reformed, that the era of change was necessary
because of the failure of Stalin and his regime’s brutality. The 1968 Czech Prague
uprising had a profound effect on Gorbachev. The idea that it was necessary for socialism
to have a human face was then widely believed. It is still a strong element of belief in
Russia, and as I found, in Ukraine. He believed in reformed Marxist solutions, he believes
in it to this day. It’s still a strong school of thought in all of the former Soviet states –
although it is a minority view, whereas it was once the only permitted view. The
hardliners, who were in charge of the security organizations, were the holdouts, but in the
perestroika time, they were the ideological minority, although they were in charge of the
security ministries. The August coup of 1991 was their last attempt to maintain control.
And that was the question, whether the ideological change, the “new thinking” so called
would prevail, or whether the hard-liners would allow the change to take place. What was
interesting, again, was the Zaslavskaya thesis about the change in the Soviet man was
correct. She said that the change in socialist society permeated everything – the military,
the intelligence agencies – there was a generational change. The Soviet man was now
close to the socialist goal – education being the big key. She did not think there would be
violence. She was right, and the futile comic coup attempt, by the pathetic coup group,
was a clear sign the change was irreversible. The Stalinist hard-liners didn’t have the
conviction that a militant group in charge of the power and security ministries in the past
would have had.
The children of the Bolshevik Revolution had a different idea. The failure of Gorbachev
to handle the expectations and demands of the intellectuals, the inability to control or at
least steer the new freedom that had been acquired by the younger generation, was the
main reason, I think, for the end of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev couldn’t accommodate
or adapt fully enough to the consequences of this new freedom. The nature of the new
idea of governance and freedom was explained in the draft Sakharov constitution. This
was a remarkable document, intellectually, and it provided a conceptual structure. The
Sakharov constitution described, in 1989, exactly where the Soviet Union was, and where
it needed to go to hang together. It had to loosen up in order to stay together. Gorbachev
resisted that loosening up. He wanted to hold the Soviet Union together in the old
arrangement, in the old Brezhnev concepts basically. He wasn’t a big enough mind,
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