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invention, was created to provide an active means of working together with states from
the former Warsaw Pact.
Q: The secretary of defense.
MILLER: Yes, Partnership for Peace made eminent sense, and worked very well, because
it allowed each country to do its own thing, at its own pace, without putting a great strain
on their capabilities. They could come in to a viable security arrangement right away,
which Partnership for Peace was, without the requirements of NATO membership that
were imposed on the Western European nations. But the idea of a new security
partnership was the focus of serious security discussions, "What is the meaning of
partnership?" And this idea of partnership was running concomitant to "What is NATO?"
NATO was no longer forces assembled for a massive war of armies on the north German
plain, because there are no forces on the other side. If NATO is dissolved, what are we
going to do with 20 tank divisions of main battle tanks, and 20 infantry divisions, what
about U.S. basing in Germany? Where should forces be deployed, for what purposes and
what kinds of forces? So there was a huge debate in Brussels, particularly, and in all the
capitals of the West. Of course the bureaucracy of Brussels wanted to continue NATO. It
was their life's work. They weren't sure that Russia would remain a weak power and that
it wouldn't become once again a power with imperial ambitions and become once again a
threat to the West and world peace.
"The keep NATO and expand it" point of view triumphed in 1995. “We will keep the
core because we can't trust the Russians, and we'll expand, certainly, to include Poland
and Czechia. We'll bring the border right up to the old Soviet Union. We'll absorb
Warsaw Pact.” So that was the '95 decision.
The formal new structure for European security was defined by the reaction of NATO, the
EU, and OSCE to Yugoslavia's disintegration. Even though Yugoslavia was certainly an
all-European issue, the decision about activities to deal with Yugoslavia were made in
Brussels, Paris, London, Washington and other Western European capitals. The views of
Moscow, Ukraine, and all the other former Warsaw Pact states, were not taken into
account. It was very clear that NATO was to be the military basis for post Cold War
European security, and that NATO would extend to the east as conditions would permit,
but that the core would remain such that the United States would be the dominant military
power and the decisions would be made in the same way that they were made in the time
of the Cold War.
On the issue of Yugoslavia, Ukraine was left outside of the debate in Brussels, since
Ukraine was not a full partner. They were active members of Partnership for Peace and
they had very good representation in that forum. Boris Tarasyuk went to Brussels and
fought the fight, but he was always seen as an outsider, not in the in-group, and noisy and
irritating because he kept bringing up the issue. He had the portfolio as ambassador to
Belgium and to NATO. I can remember very well, having gone to Brussels several times,
and to Germany to discuss this with Richard Holbrooke who was ambassador in Bonn.
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