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Ukrainian language nationalist, whereas Kuchma was Russian-speaking, although a
nominal, reluctant nationalist. The demography of Ukraine is such that the greatest
proportion of the population is in the east, and Kuchma, coming from Dnipropetrovs’k,
one of the major cities of the east, the Russian-speaking east, was able to command their
support. Even so, Kravchuk would have won reelection, if he had not been ambivalent.
Until a few months before the elections, he was saying, “I will run, I won’t run,” and
when he finally decided to run it was too late. The key votes had already been decided
upon, and Kravchuk lost.
So Kuchma, as president – this is when I really got to know him, because he understood,
from the outset, that his most important foreign relationship was with Americans and the
United States. His ties with Moscow were well-established and those ties would not be
difficult to maintain, but he had to make a stable, workable arrangement with the United
States in order to succeed as president. He understood that right away. So we spent a lot
of time together, in part because it was his desire to make clear that he wanted to have
good relations with the United States, and correspondingly, we made it very clear that we
wanted to have good relations with him.
Q: Well, what was in it for him to have these – why was it so important for him to have
good relations with the United States?
MILLER: Having made the decision to eliminate nuclear weapons – and Kuchma was a
positive force in the making of that decision, because his judgment from a technical point
of view was that it made no sense for Ukraine to keep its nuclear arsenal, that the expense
and the strategic utility brought Ukraine no benefit, making a deal with the United States
for eliminating the nuclear arsenal, in return for support – economic, political and what
Ukrainians call moral support – was the most important objective. He was very
important, even decisive, in the Ukrainian national decision to eliminate nuclear weapons.
My discussions with him about this, before he was president, when Kravchuk was still
president and they were still negotiating with us, and among themselves, centered on the
terms of the deal they would put forward on nuclear weapons. It was very clear that the
quid pro quo for giving up nuclear weapons was sustained support, economic and
political, for the foreseeable future. He understood what had to be done to get that, which
was to have close contact with us.
This desire on Kuchma’s part was made easy because the United States government
policy was to foster close contact with him and to develop the closest possible
relationship with his government. It was the policy of President Clinton and Vice
President Gore, and all of the relevant Cabinet ministers, and Secretaries. They all put in
the time and effort to make it work. So the basis of my constant contact with Kuchma was
on two levels. The first was that he wanted to discuss, in detail, the nature of this new
relationship, and secondly, he had to deal with the constant visits to Kyiv and Ukraine by
high-ranking Americans, from the president on down, and his trips to the United States
with his government, to Washington and the United States. So it was a time of sustained
intense activity at the highest level.
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