1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

There are many elements that contribute to the makeup of a political team such as
neighbors, schools, experience. That’s how the transition teams were put together and the
transition involved writing papers, speeches, laying out agendas for the work of the
incoming government. I was a part of that process. It was very clear that they wanted, in
my case, to send me to the former Soviet Union, either to Moscow or Kyiv. Tom
Pickering, my good friend, went to Moscow. I went to Kyiv.
Q: While you were working on this transition and all this, what – Strobe Talbott was sort
of the major force in looking at the former Soviet Union, was he, sort of? What was the
feeling? What could we do there?
MILLER: Well, he and Clinton, both believed that the new Russia could become a
positive force for stability. Conversely, if it didn’t receive assistance and some direction,
particularly to continue the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, that it could be a
force for instability. The believed that it was a crucial, highest priority to deal with the
former Soviet Union. They created, structurally, in the government, a separate State
Department bureau. Bureaucratically, you know how hard that is. They carved out of
EUR the former Soviet Union. To staff this new bureau, Strobe and President Clinton
chose all of the key players. Many were from the Foreign Service ranks but not all, and
they wanted the new bureau to have direction, from the President through Strobe.
Clinton’s vision was that he could work with the new leadership, with Yeltsin and his
group because they were part of the dynamics that had changed, that ended the Soviet
Union.
Q: Were you getting – when they processed (ph) these early days, with people either in
the State Department or within your transmission group or something, who were
uncomfortable with Yeltsin?
MILLER: Yes, from the outset there were people who were sentimental about the
Gorbachevian approach and would have preferred that, but that wasn’t an option. The
Gorbachev option was closed off by Gorbachev himself and the leadership actions of the
Soviet coup group.
[END TAPE]
Q: This is tape nine, side one with Bill Miller. You were saying with Yeltsin …
MILLER: Yes, Yeltsin’s group was able enough, open enough and had worked with our
official people and some of our NGOs throughout the perestroika period, so the Clinton
administration was able to deal with them directly immediately. There was a belief that
the United States and the West could have considerable influence, which was the case.
Some of it unfortunately wasn’t of the highest quality, but, on the whole, certainly on the
issues of arms control and nuclear arms control, the dangers, that side of equation, were
taken care of quite well. The understanding of the difficulties of the economic transition
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