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1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

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That was the policy when I arrived. That was the policy through the Kennedy<br />

administration, through the Johnson administration, although it was contested all the way<br />

through in the White House, not in State, not in the CIA. Yes, in the Pentagon there were<br />

some individuals who pushed a reopening up such as Bob Komer.<br />

[END TAPE]<br />

Q: This is tape four, side one with Bill Miller.<br />

MILLER: “<strong>The</strong> blowtorch”, Bob Komer, who was very close to Lyndon Johnson, <strong>and</strong> of<br />

course was deeply involved in Vietnam policy, he <strong>and</strong> Bill Polk, in the White House, who<br />

was a good friend of the Kennedys, were raising questions of political stability constantly,<br />

based on the Iranian student demonstrations that were increasing in number <strong>and</strong> size even<br />

to the extent of picketing the White House <strong>and</strong> Congress. <strong>The</strong> issue was, can the shah<br />

withst<strong>and</strong> unpopularity? Were there alternatives to the shah? So the issues were raised.<br />

Komer <strong>and</strong> Polk, came out, I can vividly remember on one occasion, to Iran on a U.S.<br />

military aircraft <strong>and</strong> annoyed the hell out of Ambassador Holmes because they were very<br />

preemptory <strong>and</strong> imperial in their manners <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ed to see the Shah <strong>and</strong> all the key<br />

figures in the government. <strong>The</strong>y were very short on courtesies.<br />

So they went throughout Iran, saw everyone they could, <strong>and</strong> wrote a report saying that the<br />

shah was unpopular, <strong>and</strong> was holding on to an increasingly weakening power base. But in<br />

the end, despite this awareness of unpopularity, on all of the critical points, the decision<br />

was made to support the shah in the face of the opposition, even democratic opposition.<br />

<strong>The</strong> crucial point, that tipped the balance as I mentioned earlier, was a decision covering<br />

roll-over funding <strong>for</strong> Prime Minister Ali Amini, an IMF rescheduling of debt payment.<br />

But the real issue was support <strong>for</strong> the shah or Parliamentary governments. Yes, there was<br />

a dispute in Washington, but the majority view was that the shah’s regime was wellfinanced,<br />

he had the military, <strong>and</strong> would prevail. <strong>The</strong> contrary view was that he didn’t<br />

have the military, except at the top. <strong>The</strong> younger ones were trained in the United States,<br />

just like the students. <strong>The</strong>y would take hold of different views – <strong>and</strong> we knew their views,<br />

because we knew them in the field.<br />

Q: We’re sort of jumping back <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>th, but you went to the line of the Secretary of –<br />

when did you go there?<br />

MILLER: It was immediately after the Peace Corps – that was in 1966.<br />

Q: And you were doing that <strong>for</strong> how long?<br />

MILLER: About a year or so.<br />

Q: So sort of ’66, ’67. What sort of things were you doing there?<br />

MILLER: <strong>The</strong> “Line” at that point was organized to give substantive <strong>and</strong> administrative<br />

71

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