1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

group, Romanov of Leningrad, who fortunately for Gorbachev and for us was a drunkard
and had collected many enemies along the way. Gorbachev had risen from relatively
modest circumstances and had found far fewer enemies along the way to the top, was
seen as a very amiable, bright and pleasant personality, even among that group. Because
of Molotov's vote, he was chosen.
With that history, Kennan and the other American Committee on U.S.-soviet Relations
thought there was going to be a very different way of looking at things in the Soviet
Union, and that it was time to press for much closer relations, particularly in the light of
the aftermath of Vietnam and in the face of a deep sense of nuclear danger. We've
forgotten now how intense that fearful thought was, and how strong the belief was of the
necessity to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. I decided to take the offered position of
President. The members of the board, being as prominent and committed as they were,
were able to get substantial support from the major foundations for the committee’s
future expanded activities.
Q: Who were some of the major figures on the board?
MILLER: From the business world there was Donald Kendall of Pepsi. He was
symptomatic of the trade between the United States and the Soviet Union that had existed
in the past, of the exchange of Stolichnaya Vodka for Pepsi and Fanta soft drinks, and as
it turned out, shipping, and many other things that produced money. On the fringe was
Armand Hammer of that uncertainty, but that's oil development and a long history of
working very closely with the Soviet Union as some have suggested as a fellow traveler,
even an agent, as his full biographic history has unfolded. Father Ted Hesburgh, who was
president of Notre Dame at the time, and Jerry Wiesner, who was president of MIT, Bob
McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, people of that character.
Q: Well, in bureau, when you got there, did you see, was there sort of the same division
as in the Politburo, the ones who saw the Soviet Union as being sort of cast in concrete
and the other ones saying, "This is a real seismic change that's happening."
MILLER: No, what was interesting about this board was that they had all traveled to the
Soviet Union and they had been on the ground, so to speak, and they thought there was a
change. Where they differed was where the change would end up, but that a process of
change was underway, we all agreed.
Q: Sort of in the climate of opinion, there's two major factors – more, but one would be
on the Hill and have people who basically made their careers anti-Communists, and the
State Department expertise, which had always seen the Soviet Union as being a bastion
and not a loose structure.
MILLER: That's true, but the arms control issue was a focus for that debate, and the
majority, substantial majority, a treaty majority, that is, two thirds, was for exploring the
possibility of rapprochement, of a real opening. I think one reason I was asked to become
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