1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

MILLER: The most important information about Iran was on the surface. It was always
on the surface. It was not an intelligence issue, it was a societal judgment, or should have
been – it was a judgment about the nature of Iranian society and how rapidly it was
moving. I would say it was policy directions that were crucial to our leaders. The
judgments about Iranian society were not dependent on correct intelligence, they were not
dependent on – the kind of intelligence provided by the CIA and the military intelligence
agencies, or the FBI or cooperation with other intelligence agencies. The necessary
information and analysis was coming from State, from journalists, from academics, from
business. Iran was at that time an open society. Iran was not closed. It was wide open,
there was a huge American presence; it was easy to have a full awareness of what was
happening. It was the psychological problem of denial about what was happening, you
might say, and an unmovable comfort with past arrangements that needed to be changed.
The public warning signals were very strong. They began in the most dramatic way, in
1976, when the shah had the spectacular Persepolis celebration of the 3,000 years of
monarchy in Iran, where he crowned himself, and the great excesses of his regime were
seen by all of the world who came to this great mega-party in Persepolis. They could see
the poverty and wealth, the dramatic excess.
Of course, the Iranian students who were here, in the United States 50,000 a year, made it
very clear by their constant demonstrations against the shah where they thought Iran
should go – and these students were the hope of the future. I would say many of the most
diligent scholars, and academics of contemporary Iran spoke of the dangers. When Helms
went out, in the Nixon period …
Q: He was the director of the CIA, or had been.
MILLER: Yes, and he was sent out to Iran in exile, so to speak. This was in ’75, in that
period. It was very clear that things were rumbling, and within the embassy there was a
dispute. The decisions really came down to, in the Jimmy Carter period, when the
unpopularity of the shah was extremely pronounced and growing, and the issue was,
what’s happening? “Is there an alternative to the Shah?” And the answer was, he’s
extremely unpopular. The judgment question was, do we stick with him or do we support
an alternative – what is the alternative? The debate in the Carter administration was
between Brzezinski and Vance – the NSC vs. State.
Vance was of the view that the shah was finished and we should support the nationalist
democrats, as weak as they were. Brzezinski was of the view – as was Kissinger and the
establishment – that the shah had served us well, and we should stick with him. So it was
that issue until the very end. A year before the end, when George Ball was brought in to
have an independent review. He made a review, and he said, “Support the nationalist
democrats,” but it was too late.
Q: Did you have any personal involvement, being an Iranian hand?
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