1 The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign ...

Q: Who?
MILLER: Sam Giancana, a mobster from Chicago who attempted one of the
assassinations of Castro. I recall his testimony before the committee when he was asked
about his attempted assassination. The chairman asked, "So why did you do these things?
Did you get paid by the CIA?" Giancana replies, "No." The chairman the asked, "Well,
why did you do it?" Giancana, pulled himself up with a look of offended dignity and said
in clipped tones, "It was my patriotic duty."
Q: Did you, looking at the various assassination, coup attempts, destabilizing this, were
you also looking at this – as somebody looking at this thing, were these things really
effective, or really advancing the cause?
MILLER: Well, I said the committee divided itself into two parts. One was investigative,
the hunting ground of litigators and trial lawyers who were looking to say "guilty," or "not
guilty." My colleague, Fritz Schwartz, who was a superb litigator, a good friend, handled
many of the hearings on those subjects. The majority of senators and I wanted to deal
with the constitutional issues concerning the authority for secret activities, the substance
of intelligence activities, the evaluation of its quality and what should be done with the
intelligence agencies in the future. We researched and evaluated all intelligence activity in
the United States from the time of the Revolutionary War, but with a particular emphasis
since the formation of the CIA, 1945 up to 1975, and governmental activities that were
normal categories of intelligence collection, counterintelligence, analysis, and technical
means. We were able to carry out a rigorous top to bottom the survey of intelligence
broadly construed, that would be of service to the president and the United States, the
congress and in the end as a benefit to our people and our country.
So, the approaches were legality, utility, needs, what is needed to do a good job? Who
does the best job? Is the organization properly structured to do a good job? Should it be
revamped, recreated, reinvented? That was the main work of the committee. We came out
with conclusion that the best political reporting came from the State Department; that
much of the clandestine activity was destructive; and that a good part of the highly touted
clandestinely gathered intelligence material was not in fact of great value; that the
National Technical Means were the best sources of information on nuclear questions; that
there had been a huge misstep in developing paramilitary capability at the expense of
traditional humint intelligence.
Q: Would this be Bay of Pigs-type things, or Vietnam/Bay of Pigs?
MILLER: All of the coups had heavy paramilitary aspects. There may have been utility
during the Vietnam and Cuba episodes, but that the fact that these large paramilitary
structures lingered long after their original missions distorted later missions of
particularly the CIA and the military intelligence agencies. This is where Edward Wilson
comes from, with his pearl handled pistols that world of paramilitary soldiers of fortune,
the one who was just pardoned.
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