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Moscow, meeting with the Sakharovs, and I recall their discussions about what the new
order could be for the Soviet Union.
The whole idea of self determination, which was implicit, didn't exclude being sovereign,
but within a changed Soviet Union – a democratic Soviet Union. It was a very real hope –
that is, the possibility of a democratic Soviet Union. The chance for a democratic Soviet
Union is challenged by the drive to create an independent Russia. Yeltsin, as you
remember, championed the independence movement of Russia. His motivations I would
say were primarily personal. Yeltsin wanted to break the power of Gorbachev, his sworn
enemy. I don't think it was the highest of motives. At the same time, many members of
the Supreme Soviet were also elected to the Russian Parliament, so they served, for a
time, in the legislature in both places. In the opinion of most political observers of the
time, the very best, the most talented were those who decided to stay with the Soviet
Union. I thought so too. They said our highest duty is with the Soviet Union. We can't
serve two masters and it doesn't make any sense.
It was very clear at the time, that the quality of the people in Supreme Soviet, the last
Supreme Soviet, was far higher than those who made up the new Russian Parliament. I
knew many of the legislators who served in both, and I would say the very best stayed,
mistakenly, as it turned out, in the Supreme Soviet.
That crucial period in Moscow was extraordinarily hopeful from the point of view of the
possibilities of constructing a new Europe, a new world after the failed experiment of the
Communist Party. Russia lost its direction when it lost Sakharov. I can't emphasize how
important he was. He was able to lead and have effect on people like Havel in Prague, or
Lech Walesa in Poland.
Q: In Poland?
MILLER: Yes, yes, and within the Soviet states. I would say once the Sakharov’s moral
and intellectual leadership was gone and there was a divided struggle for power between
Yeltsin and Gorbachev, the impetus for self determination, independent states, gained
sway, and that was really the end. The coup attempt was very symptomatic. The coup was
the last gasp, a last-ditch effort by a military coup, by those who wanted t keep the Soviet
Union together.
Q: How did your organization and you see, first place, developments prior to the coup?
Was this euphoric, more or less, or were you doing anything, passing on information?
MILLER: We were just as active after the coup as before in working in the parliaments of
both of these structures, and in the new ministries of Russia, particularly the Ministry of
Justice, while at the same time the existing Soviet structures were in place. There was a
kind of joint responsibility of many of those who were Russian and those from outside
who were really helping both places, because it was all seen at that time as useful. But,
certainly, there was an overall sense of waiting, waiting for the decision. There was a
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