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ganging up against Kyiv, the new state. That impasse was created, in my view, because of
the initial approach and style taken. I decided, and perhaps it's my temperament, to listen
with courtesy and take no positions until I had heard them out.
Immediately after my arrival in Kyiv, I followed up on the earlier meetings I had held
with the legislators and the messengers from the Ukrainian government in August in
Washington. I met everyone I could, from Communists to ultra-nationalists, and asked
them all what they really thought.
I had to do this very quickly, because there was great worry and anxiety in Washington.
There was also great concern about the hostile approach of the United States towards
Ukraine. Very soon after I had arrived, presented credentials, had a very long meeting
with President Kravchuk in Marinskiy Palace, where we went over the basic issues and
listed what we hoped to accomplish together. Kravchuk said his government and the Rada
had come to a policy decision in Kyiv, which was that Ukraine would, in accord with
their previous declarations, even before independence, become a non-nuclear state. They
would agree to eliminate all weapons on their territory, provided security assurances were
given that we would support Ukraine in the event of military, political, or economic
pressure, and there would be economic assistance for their dismantlement and
elimination, and that we would support Ukraine politically and economically through its
initial difficulties.
The main questions in Ukrainian minds was could the Americans be trusted to support
Ukraine fully. There were reservations both Kravchuk and the parliament made clear. The
parliamentarians and the president's government clearly reflected the spectrum of views,
including a substantial majority view, that believed that the Americans couldn't be trusted
to carry out their word, and that Ukraine should retain its nuclear weapons as a hedge, as
a deterrent, not to be used, because the Ukrainian elite was very clear on the strategic
utility of the use of nuclear weaponry, but as a bargaining chip, to assure their
independence. So my task was to say, "You can count on us, we're with you." And after
saying that to convince Kravchuk and the leaders of the Rada that the United States
would stand with them particularly comforting threats from Russia.
I reported immediately to Washington the resolution of the Rada on nuclear weapons,
which had these reservations, and I commented that I thought this was the basis of a good
agreement. The reaction from Washington was not what I expected, rather it was along
the lines of, "Go back and tell them there can be no conditions except elimination." And I
said, "No, this is a good agreement. Come and see for yourself." Secretary Christopher,
Talbott and a big DOD delegation came within a week and we began the march on the
path to agreement. It was signed in Moscow the following January 14.
Q: I mean, hadn't we expressed our view that what the Ukrainians were asking or
demanding, that's what we were planning to do anyway, wasn't it? To support the
dismantling of these weapons?
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