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January-March 2010 JOURNAL OF EURASIAN STUDIES Volume II., Issue 1. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Rising Tensions Developments in the recent years have indicated tough posturing by the courtiers of the region. The tensions have not only confined to bilateral level, but it has acquired multiple dimensions involving multiple players with conflicting alignments. The year 2007 has witnessed a spurt in this trend. Following a meeting of CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) secretaries in Bishkek on 21 September 2007, Nikolai Bordyuzha, the secretary-general of CSTO told journalists that the organization's members are concerned by ‘militant statements’ of intent expressed by South Caucasus officials to resolve ‘frozen’ conflicts by resorting to military force. According to him, the increase in defence spending planned by Georgia and Azerbaijan constitutes a ‘serious threat’ to CSTO members. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News line 21 September 2007) The Russian-Georgian rivalry too has played an important role in the rising tensions in the region. In the Tkvarcheli incident, the Georgian forces entered in the name of ‘counter-terrorist operation’ Abkhazia’s Tkvarcheli district and allegedly attacked an Abkhazian army training camp, killing two Russians, and taking 6 Abkhazians and Armenians to Tbilisi where they were put behind bars. In another incident, on the night of 27 September 2007 dispatches began to arrive for the mass shootings on the southern outskirts of Tzkhinvali, the South-Ossetian capital by automatic weapons, heavy machine guns, grenade throwers, and mortars. Almost simultaneously, attacks were launched on the northern outskirts of the South-Ossetian capital, adjacent to the Georgian village of Tamarasheni, where Georgian troops and police had entered before in violation of all previous agreements. Several residents of Tzkhinvali were wounded. And even though the shooting appears to have stopped, there is no guarantee that it would not be resumed. Unlike previous events of the kind never stopping since 2004, this time South Ossetian troops opened return fire and the government of Abkhazia decided to deploy several auxiliary contingents at its border with Georgia. The Russian media’s increasing advocacy to recognize the de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia provoked such an action from Georgia. According to some analysts, Georgia has taken such a step in order to divert attention from domestic instability. In this context, it can be mentioned that the charges labelled by Ex-Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili against President Mikheil Saakashvili has become an issue of public debate about the integrity of administration at Tbilisi. It can be further noted that the president had imposed emergency in the whole country in the first week of November 2007 amidst huge protest. There have been frequent attacks on private media such as Imedi. Radical Georgian leaders such as Kitovani have made statements like, ‘peaceful unification of Georgia is impossible. The problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia can only be solved in war.’ Washington’s earlier praise of Georgia as the ‘democracy standard bearer’ might have ensconced Georgian leaders to take such a drastic action to assert their rights over de facto republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Saakashvili’s reelection as president in 5 January 2008 elections would like further strengthen Georgia-US relations and feed to suspicions of further worsening of Georgia-Russia relations. Like Georgia, Azerbaijan too has recently raised bellicose tactics over Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Its emerging economy due to energy resources has paved the way for hardcore policy towards the issue, not only in terms of public display of sabre-rattling but also in terms of increasing defence budget. The problem is that there are no Azeri enclaves in Nagorno-Karabakh and the buffer zone where weapons could be delivered the way Tbilisi authorities do in the Kodor Gorge and Liakhv corridor. Owing to this _____________________________________________________________________________________ © Copyright Mikes International 2001-2010 128
January-March 2010 JOURNAL OF EURASIAN STUDIES Volume II., Issue 1. _____________________________________________________________________________________ and other factors a successful Azeri ‘blitzkrieg’ in Nagorno-Karabakh is actually out of the question, whereas the danger of probable major provocations or even hostilities along the entire Armenian-Azeri border is significantly growing. (Areshev 2007) The current system of the military and political alliances prevents any possible escalation of conflict to the level of large scale war. Russia-Armenia agreement on military cooperation is matched by the military support of NATO countries to Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, the tensions in the region would likely to continue and aggravate in the near future. While Georgia allegedly is afraid of Russian superiority in the region, Russia is concerned about Georgian complicity in Chechen terrorism. There are reports that Pankisi Gorge in Georgia has been a safe haven for Chechen terrorists. In overall prevailing scenario, it can be emphasised that the spirit of cooperation instead of conflict needs to be fostered in the region. Georgian unity and statehood with the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic is difficult to materialize without good relations with Russia. The presidents of the five Caspian countries agreed tentatively and in general terms to create an institutional framework for regional cooperation on economic, legal, and some security issues at their summit in Tehran in October 2007. The presidents, who had not met since 2002 in this format, decided to hold regular five-country summits each year. At the Tehran summit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed the formation of a Caspian Sea organization, which would ‘facilitate economic cooperation and trade, maintain security and peace in the sea, prevent military and naval competition, and deal with trans-border crime.’ Then Russian President Putin endorsed Ahmadinejad’s proposal. However, many hurdles need to be overcome before the proposed organisation becomes a reality. On legal issues, the presidents agreed that all shipping, fishing, and transportation in the Caspian Sea would be carried out exclusively under the flags of riparian countries. This decision besides formalising the existing situation also prevents external powers to play role in the dispute over the sea basin. The summit declaration calls for all legal issues to be resolved peacefully by the riparian states themselves — a formulation apparently designed to forestall official assistance from other parties. However, the presidents avoided discussing the differences among riparian countries over the method of dividing the seabed and waters. (Socor 2007) Another crucial development took place on 4 November 2007. Meeting in Sukhumi in Abkhazia on this day, the presidents of the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester — Sergei Bagapsh, Eduard Kokoity, and Igor Smirnov, respectively — pledged in a joint declaration to continue political cooperation aimed at ‘preventing the tensions engendered by Georgia from erupting into full-scale conflict’ and to draft a joint strategy for countering external aggression. They also signed agreements on economic, financial, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation. The Abkhazian leader told that the three republics share the goals of formal international recognition and strengthening cooperation with the Russian Federation. Kokoity emphasized on the need of the presence of the Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict zones should remain there until those conflicts are resolved. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News line 7 November 2007) It can be mentioned here that Georgia has demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia. The imposition of emergency in Georgia in 2007 has raised questions on the commitment of Georgian leaders to democracy. Just aftermath of the imposition, the US State Department, the OSCE, and the EU _____________________________________________________________________________________ © Copyright Mikes International 2001-2010 129
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