Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

But, he carried on, “when they take a vessel of ours, they not only get a rich
prize, but they enslave the men, and … demand most exorbitant ransoms for
them.” Accordingly he envisaged “send[ing] a force sufficient to burn a town,”
but he doubted its success on account of the long experience of Algiers with
such assaults on its coast and therefore their ineffectiveness. He, however,
considered that such an action would be reasonably feasible if the great
maritime powers of Europe could be persuaded “to unite in the suppression of
these piracies.” But, according to him, the second option was almost desperate
since those powers “submit to be tributary to these robbers, and even encourage
them;” so, it would be unwise to act unilaterally against them. Ultimately, he
recommended prudence arguing that “it would be very imprudent for us to
entertain any thoughts of contending with them.” 108
Adams’ opinion is
illustrative of a wide political debate over the issue of ‘war vs. tribute’; an issue
that dominated American politics until 1815.
c) Accounting Management: War or Peace? Which would Cost
Less? Typical to American commercial diplomacy is the constable role
endorsed by its ministers plenipotentiaries, on top of that of commercial agents.
Adams and Jefferson were no exception; rather they were its initiators and
founding fathers. Up to 1789, the conduct of American relations with Algiers
fell entirely to them; they referred to Congress only in matters relating to
appropriations. Therefore, what they could have decided was of crucial
108 WJA, 8:218, From John Adams to John Jay, December 15, 1784.
276