Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

Algiers as it was implicitly understood from the Madison letter about the
George Washington. In the same report, Lear included a detailed analysis about
Algiers military weaknesses and the prospect of a swift American victory. He
considered the Alleghany event as “a happy and fortunate event for the United
States” and that “Should our differences with Great Britain be so
accommodated as to admit of sending a naval force into this sea, Algiers will be
humbled to the dust.” 85 His description of the naval force of Algiers was an
inviting element for an American naval strike. According to him, the few
frigates were “very old ships, hardly seaworthy,” the gun boats used for the
defense of the bay were “either broken up or entirely unfit for service,” the
command—precisely Rais Hamidou, referred to as Rais Hammida—was “a
bold, active, enterprising commander, but entirely unacquainted with any
regular mode of fighting,” the sailors, “if such they may be called who go out
in their cruisers, know nothing of regular combat at sea.” 86 For the rest, Lear
was sure “that our brave officers and seamen would rejoice to meet them with
only half their force.” 87
Those military weaknesses were sufficient reasons for the United States
for undertaking a naval action against Algiers. Indeed many writers today
consider that the United States had attacked Algiers not because of its strength
which supposedly threatened American interests, as the American Consul-
General at Algiers William Shaler (1816-1828) pretended later, but because of
85 SPPD, 9:140, Lear to Secretary of State, July 29, 1812. Emphasis is in original text.
86 Ibid., 9:142-43.
87 Ibid., 9:143.
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