Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

from China for which Lord Temple received the correction of a lawyer; for the
American consuls at Algiers there would be no such concern because article 20
exempted them from paying duties: “the Consul… shall not be required to Pay
duty for any thing he brings from a foreign Country.” In sum, the treaty was a
disaster for Algiers.
By insisting on stores and money aspects, the Dey seemed not to give
importance to the provisions of the treaty; his khodjas wrote the treaty in
Turkish but Cathcart and Skjoldebrand adopted the Swedish treaty of 1729; the
disparities between the two translations of the treaty are enormous. Probably,
the Dey considered that as long as the Americans paid him respect (through
presents) and provided him with material for his corsairs, on which he could
rely, he had nothing to fear from them. And that was fatal strategy. Relying on
corsairs that could not even supply their captured vessels with ammunitions
and cordages was certainly a bad idea. 93 And the Americans were conscious
about that.
A report communicated to the House of Representatives on January 20,
1794 clearly indicated the bad condition of the “naval force of the Algerines”
and expressed opinion that “six ships… will be sufficient to protect the
Commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs.” 94
In March
1794, Congress had passed ‘An act to provide a naval armament,’ commonly
93 As indication of Algiers’ needs in naval material see Cathcart, “Diplomatic Journal and Letter
Book,” pp. 398-99; also Appendix 10B.
94 American State Papers, Class VI: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the
United States: Naval Affairs. 1794-1825, edited by Lowrie and Clarke (Washington, D.C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1832-1861), 1:395, Naval Force against Algiers, Jan. 20, 1794. (Hereafter cited as ASP/NA).
Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwdg.html
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