Ottoman Algeria in Western Diplomatic History with ... - Bibliothèque

use of gunboat diplomacy resulted in the conclusion of a new treaty with the
Dey of Algiers in 1815. Dictated at the mouth of cannons, that treaty ended
payments in naval stores as well as enslavement of American prisoners; the two
were cornerstones in Algiers’ corsairing diplomacy. Consequently, corsairing
diplomacy lost its vigor and ultimately crumbled under the effects of gunboat
diplomacy. Second, by declaring war on Algiers in 1815, American foreign
policy objectives were two-fold: by defeating a small country, the United States
projected to secure for itself the most favorable place at Algiers. While the first
objective was reached easily, the second met partial failure as Great Britain
dispatched squadrons to Algiers to contest it. Nonetheless, the United States
could place its economic interests on an equal footing with those of the major
powers at Algiers. In the long run, however, the gunboats show of 1815-1816
and deployment of the U.S. navy in the area assured the United States
permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean.
That was an age of corsairing and gunboat diplomacies where the
collapse of the former gave momentum to the latter. Algiers found itself
squeezed between major maritime powers at a time naval supremacy, which
originally guaranteed and supported its corsairing diplomacy, had deserted
Algiers’ shores since long. With an obsolete fleet which still counted one rowgalley
and six pierriers in 1815, it was obvious that Algiers could no more
defend itself against Christian attacks at a time new technologies assured naval
superiority for Europe and the United States. Moreover, Algiers’ handful
Turkish rulers clung to corsairing principles that were frozen in a remote past
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