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166 QUANTIFICATION OF BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA<br />

the commitments, countries would therefore like to<br />

persevere with the existing classification of the GATS,<br />

even though it is recognised to be out of date. For<br />

example, in the Indo-Singapore CECA (signed on 29<br />

June 2005 and came into force on 1 August 2005),<br />

telecommunication services are defined following a<br />

positive list approach, like in the GATS. 6<br />

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF GATS AND<br />

OTHER RULES AND DISCIPLINES FOR<br />

TELECOMMUNICATIONS<br />

The WTO rules and disciplines for telecom comprise<br />

the GATS, the Annex on Telecommunications<br />

(hereinafter the Annex) and the Schedules of commitments<br />

made under the GATS. In addition, the Reference<br />

Paper provides the basic thrust of major regulatory<br />

disciplines that are relevant to telecom services. The<br />

Annex recognises ‘the specificities of the telecommunications<br />

service sector and, in particular, its dual role as<br />

a distinct sector of economic activity and as the underlying<br />

transport means for other economic activities’, i.e.<br />

importance of telecommunications as an input for other<br />

sectors.<br />

The Annex comprises seven sections, with the core<br />

obligations contained in the section on access to and<br />

use of ‘public telecommunications transport network<br />

and services’ (or PTTNS). These require WTO members<br />

to ensure that access to and use of the PTTNS are<br />

allowed on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms<br />

for the supply of services included in its schedules. This<br />

would be true even when no basic telecom service<br />

commitments have been made by the government in<br />

its schedule, and whether or not such PTTNS is supplied<br />

by a monopoly or through competition. Inasmuch as a<br />

Commitment in a Member’s schedule on basic telecom<br />

services is for the supply of these services, access to<br />

and use of PTTNS on reasonable and nondiscriminatory<br />

terms is a mandatory requirement under<br />

the provisions of this Annex. In addition, there is<br />

recognition of the need for maintaining security and<br />

confidentiality of messages, safeguarding universal<br />

service and other public obligations, and protection of<br />

the technical integrity of the networks.<br />

Several governments felt that explicit regulatory<br />

principles should be drawn up for basic telecom<br />

services, particularly in order to guard against anticompetitive<br />

behaviour by incumbents. This was based<br />

on the view that the telecom sector normally has a<br />

dominant supplier who could alter the market situation<br />

to the disadvantage of a newcomer. Further, an<br />

Table 15.2 WTO Reference Paper: Definitions<br />

and Principles<br />

Definition/Principles<br />

Definitions<br />

Description<br />

The Reference Paper applies rules to<br />

‘major suppliers’ of telecommunications<br />

services who have ‘control over<br />

essential facilities’ or uses its position<br />

to ‘materially affect the terms of participation’.<br />

Competitive Governments must take appropriate<br />

Safeguards<br />

measures to prevent suppliers of telecommunications<br />

services from using<br />

anti-competitive practices such as<br />

cross-subsidisation, apply information<br />

obtained from competitors in an uncompetitive<br />

manner, or denying competitors<br />

access to relevant technical<br />

information.<br />

Interconnection Governments must ensure that major<br />

suppliers provide interconnection of<br />

their networks to other service suppliers<br />

at ‘any technically feasible point in the<br />

network’. Major suppliers will offer<br />

interconnection that is non-discriminatory,<br />

timely, and at a rate and quality<br />

‘no less favourable’ than that provided<br />

for its own subsidiaries or affiliates.<br />

Universal Service Governments may set universal service<br />

obligations, as long as they are administered<br />

in a transparent, non-discriminatory,<br />

competitively neutral manner and<br />

are not more burdensome as necessary<br />

in reaching their policy objectives.<br />

Transparency Under circumstances where licenses<br />

are required, the licensing criteria,<br />

timeframe, and terms and conditions<br />

are to be made publicly available.<br />

Upon the request of the applicant, the<br />

reasons for denial of a license will be<br />

made known.<br />

Independent The regulatory body must be separate<br />

Regulators<br />

and not accountable to any supplier of<br />

basic telecommunications services and<br />

that its procedures be impartial.<br />

Allocation and Use Government procedures for the allocaof<br />

Scare Resources tion and use of scare resources, such<br />

as frequencies and numbers, must be<br />

objective, timely, transparent and nondiscriminatory.<br />

Source: Compiled from www.wto.org<br />

6<br />

A positive list approach gives countries the flexibility to choose the sectors/sub-sectors and modes within those sectors/subsectors<br />

for making commitments.

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