rural-urban dynamics_report.pdf - Khazar University

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110 RURAL-URBAN DISPARITIES AND DYNAMICS GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2013 FIGURE 2.10 Proportion of urban population living in slums, 1990–2010 80 70 % of slum population 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Developing regions North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and the Caribbean Eastern Asia Sourthern Asia South-Eastern Asia Western Asia Oceania 1990 2000 2010 Source: UN-Habitat 2010. prevents this dimension from being formally included in estimates of slums. 5 In developing countries, where all five indicators are often found together, extreme deprivation occurs. Given that the two poorest regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, are the farthest behind on access to safe water and sanitation, it is no surprise that they also house a large proportion of their urban population in slums (figure 2.10). Poorly functioning land and housing markets, lack of urban planning, and exclusionary attitudes toward the urban poor are the main reasons why the urban poor are forced to reside in low-quality housing on insecure land with few or no basic services (Baker 2008). Insecurity of tenure takes on complex forms in situations where slum populations represent a mix of owners, squatters, and renters. Slum settlements may have differing degrees of marginalization depending on the recognition of their status by the government. Slums may actually serve the urban poor by offering low-cost housing and potential proximity to work. Slum settlements can also be the basis for self-employment and operation of small home-based businesses. Lack of basic services in cities is often tied to insecure tenure. According to the United Nation’s MDG Report 2012, slum evictions without due legal process are the most visible violation of housing rights confronted by the urban poor. Slum evictions have increased significantly since 2000. For example, in Jakarta in 2003/04 more than 100,000 people were either evicted or threatened with eviction as part of an effort to clear various areas of informal occupation. In Beijing, an estimated 300,000 people lost their homes as a result of preparations for the 2008 Olympic Games (Du Plessis 2005). While slum and informal settlements may provide an entry point into cities in the short run, they are likely to have negative impacts on the conditions of the urban poor in the medium and long term. A lack of government intention to provide basic services in slum settlements does not necessarily deter urban poor and rural migrants for whom slums are the only entry point into urban areas. It does, however, negatively affect their
GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2013 RURAL-URBAN DISPARITIES AND DYNAMICS 111 BOX 2.5 Costs of coping with lack of water service In Bangladesh, in the absence of state-provided services, a parallel network of service providers known as mastaans provides the needed services for high fees, with patronage from politicians and law enforcement agencies. Based on interviews with government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, a World Bank (2007) report noted that the mastaans exploited slum residents not only by demanding high rates for the provision of basic services but also by using physical force and threats of eviction when payoffs were not made. Such instances are not limited to Bangladesh. Water sold at water kiosks in informal settlements in Eldoret, Kenya, costs more than five times what residents in the formal urban areas of Eldoret pay the municipal council for water (Kimani-Murage and Ngindu 2007). Karuiki and Schwartz (2005) analyzed data from 47 countries (93 locations) and found that the average water prices charged by private vendors compared with the public network were four and a half times higher for point sources (ranging from a simple connection to a standpost or kiosk and tap to a borehole with tank, pipe and tap) that are most commonly found in peri-urban or unplanned settlements with unclear tenure. These higher costs of access to water associated with the use of informal providers not only increase expenditures of slum households but may also increase costs related to ill health. In Indonesia, the use of lowpriced drinking water of lesser quality from informal providers by slum families was associated with considerably higher infant and under-five mortality as well as child morbidity (Semba et al. 2009). The lack of safe water provision in urban slums has far-reaching implications and threatens the progress of MDGs related to poverty eradication and child health. economic situation if they have no choice but to rely on private and informal providers for provision of basic services at higher cost than those provided by the government to other strata of the society (box 2.5). Eviction from slums can drastically affect the livelihood of the residents by spatially displacing them from the proximity of their livelihoods, creating higher transportation costs. Because slums are also sites of economic production for small business enterprises, slum evictions and demolitions can also destroy livelihoods (Mehra, Maik, and Rudolf 2012; Du Plessis 2005). Given the lack of access to insurance or secure savings, such losses can create dire economic conditions for the urban poor. Slum dwellers often cope with these problems by discontinuing the education of children, especially girls. More significantly, the lack of legal recognition of slum settlements translates into poor access to basic services, especially water and sanitation, for those living in slums. For example, more than 50 percent of the slum population in South Asia and 40 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa lack access to sanitation services (UN-Habitat 2010). In the slums of Nairobi, there is one toilet for every 500 people on average. (There are, however, some encouraging though rare examples to redress the lack of toilets, including an initiative in Agra, India, described in box 2.6). Governments are reluctant to provide basic services to slum settlements with insecure tenure, for fear such actions will encourage further urban poor settlement on unoccupied lands and invite rural migrants to migrate to cities in expectation of better services (Durand- Lasserve 2006). According to the World Population Policies Report (UN 2011), in 1976, 44 percent of developing countries reported having implemented policies to restrict or retard rural-urban migration; by 2011, that proportion had increased to 72 percent. Further, the inability of migrants to prove urban residence via water or electricity bills or formal rental leases in slums, along with their informal employment, makes their situation even more precarious. In some countries, proof of urban residence is needed to
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Global Monitoring Report 2013 Rural
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© 2013 International Bank for Reco
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vi CONTENTS GLOBAL MONITORING REPOR
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viii CONTENTS GLOBAL MONITORING REP
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Foreword Global Monitoring Report (
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Acknowledgments This report has bee
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Abbreviations and Acronyms ADB Asia
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GMR 2013 Rural-Urban Dynamics and t
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4 OVERVIEW GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT
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10 OVERVIEW GLOBAL MONITORING REPOR
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Goals and Targets from the Millenni
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Progress toward the MDGs Only two y
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primary completion, and access to s
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FIGURE 1a Poverty rates (living on
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MDG 2 Achieve universal primary edu
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MDG 3 Promote gender equality and e
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MDG 4 Reduce child mortality In mos
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MDG 5 Reduce maternal mortality MDG
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MDG 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
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FIGURE 6e Children under age 5 who
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FIGURE 7b Access to sanitation by r
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Improving the measurement of develo
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1 Macroeconomic, Trade, and Aid Dev
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GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2013 MACRO
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GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2013 URBAN
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Appendix Table A1.1 Classification
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ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits St
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