Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Internationally, the RF earned a dubious nickname
of “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons.” 28 Frequent
claims at the early stages of the Yeltsin regime that
Russia seeks adherence to the “club of civilized Western
nations,” were not backed up by serious efforts at
internal evolution to comply with international standards
of democratic governance.
The Yeltsin government was unable to define
coherently and explain to the public the goals and
orientation of Russian foreign, military, and nuclear
policies. Despite a flurry of international exchanges
between Russian officials and foreign dignitaries, the
Russians remained ultimately confused whether the
RF was “with” or “against” the United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on most
global and regional issues. It appears that Yeltsin himself
thought that the Russian nuclear potential was an
“automatic guarantee” of Russian security and a barrier
to others’ alleged anti-Russian policies. 29
While the Yeltsin government supported denuclearization
of other former Soviet Republics and actually
helped in this process, e.g., under the “Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program,” 30 it continued to rely
heavily on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence
strategies. Moreover, it was under the Yeltsin regime
that Russia started a movement away from the nonfirst-use
of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine.
The process was typical for Yeltsin’s erratic style of
policymaking when lots of people in his immediate
entourage competed for the right to define and represent
Russian interests to the outside world.
On December 21, 1991, at a meeting in Alma-Aty,
Kazakhstan, where leaders of former Soviet republics
joined the declaration on the creation of the Commu-
111