Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

NATO/U.S. and Chinese air and other strike capabilities
in terms of both air defense and nuclear systems;
they certainly add considerably to the burden on the
Russian economy. If the new treaty fails to achieve ratification,
as appears quite possible, Russia may decide
it needs to undergo even more nuclear and conventional
buildups from this level.
Even taking rising defense budgets into account,
the inefficiency of much of that spending, the inherent
inflationary pressures in the Russian economy, especially
in the raw materials sector, the ineptitude of
the defense industrial sector, and its vulnerability to
the theft of 30-40 percent of the defense budget, which
has not decreased despite a vigorous anti-corruption
campaign, suggests a corresponding and ongoing
structural inability to realize the goals indicated in
the plans for modernizing the Russian armed forces
by 2015 or by 2020. 39 Moreover, given the constraints
on the budget even under increased defense spending,
Russia will probably not be able to afford the necessary
outlays for this comprehensive technological
modernization of the armed forces and will have to
utilize nuclear capabilities more than others do. Those
capabilities are also under pressure as the Bulava’s
sorry experience indicates (the Bulava is Russia’s new
submarine launched ballistic missile [SLBM] and, as of
April 2010, it has failed during all of its first 12 tests).
So we may likely see Russia assigning to its nuclear
forces a broader range of missions than might otherwise
be performed by conventional forces. 40
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