Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

troversy over missile defense. In his view, however,
the system does not need to be fully integrated and
instead could be built on dividing responsibility for
different sectors. 70
The proposed Russian contribution is still S-300
and S-400 systems, which are now in a more advanced
stage than they used to be 10 years ago. In fact, the
S-400 entered test deployment in 2007 and is expected
to go into mass production later this year or in 2011,
following long delays with development of a new interceptor.
Moreover, Russia is conducting R&D on a
still more advanced system, S-500 Triumphator, which
is supposed to be ready for production in 2015 (given
multiple-year delays with S-400, this official timeline
does not sound very realistic, though). With S-500,
Russia could reach the parameters proposed by Yesin
(7 km/second for incoming missiles; S-400 can only
intercept missiles with less than 5 km/second speed).
All in all, solution to the issue of missile defense
remains elusive. Perhaps the biggest challenge is lack
of any clarity with regard to a final solution; thus, it is
difficult to decide which way dialogue should steer.
The Russian preference seems to be for a new ABM
treaty of some sort that would regulate missile defense
to guarantee mutual vulnerability of the United
States and Russia. Such a solution is hardly feasible in
the near future. Furthermore, the Russian position on
missile defense is limited by its close cooperation with
China, whose criteria for a new international regime
in missile defense are likely to be even more restrictive
than those of Russia. While a new politically or legally
binding regime on missile defense seems improbable,
it is nevertheless still advisable to discuss it, perhaps
unofficially, to enhance predictability and promote
better understanding of the positions of all parties.
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