Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

mankind to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe,” the
general explained. 92
Other aspects of Moscow’s attitude towards the
issue of reducing TNW appear entirely unrealistic.
In early April 2010, Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Buzhinsky,
the former Head of the Defense Ministry’s
International Legal Department, said that Russia
could begin such discussions only after first achieving
conventional parity with the United States, including
in relation to high-precision weapons.
We should not start negotiations on the reduction of
tactical nuclear armaments as long as we have disparity
in conventional armaments, especially high-precision
ones. Under these circumstances, tactical nuclear
armaments are means of deterrence and any reductions
will inevitably damage Russian security. 93
Clearly, given the ongoing problems facing the Russian
defense industry combined with the technology
lag between its research and development compared
to the United States, as well as the woefully inadequate
level of modern equipment and weapons in
the Russian TOE, such parity will prove impossible
to achieve. But his assertion underscores a far deeper
anxiety relating to long-term Russian conventional
forces weaknesses that will prove to be a significant
barrier among the security elites in placing the tactical
nuclear reduction issue on the table. Buzhinsky went
further than many experts. Referring to the precondition
that the United States unilaterally withdraws its
TNW from Europe prior to entering US-Russian talks,
he added that all related infrastructure in Europe must
be dismantled in order to rule out redeployment later.
76