Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Force, whose leaders rarely if ever mention tactical
nuclear weapons.
Indicative of the attitude toward the possible role
of TNW was the rejection by the Russian government
and the military of proposals to deploy short-range
nuclear-capable assets in response to the U.S.-planned
missile defense assets in Poland in 2008—at the time
when George W. Bush plans were regarded as a serious
and immediate threat to Russia. The General Staff
was quick at dismissing rumors (apparently, originating
in Lithuania) that Russia would equip surface
ships and submarines of the Baltic Fleet with tactical
nuclear weapons. 30 Similarly, a September 2008 highlevel
meeting in Kaliningrad oblast, involving representatives
from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign
Affairs at the level of deputy minister, General Staff,
Administration of the President, as well as security
services, rejected the proposal to deploy nuclear weapons
in the exclave. 31 Chairman of the Duma Defense
Committee retired General Viktor Zavarzin explained
that preference was given instead to high-precision
conventional assets. 32 Proposals about deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus were similarly not
taken to heart. Russian ambassador to Minsk Aleksandr
Surikov announced that Russia would not return
nuclear weapons to Belarus but would consider
deployment of tactical conventional Iskander missiles
and short-range aircraft with precision-guided weapons.
33
Short-range weapons are also often said to have
another role—that of deterring Chinese conventional
forces. 34 The logic is similar to the common beliefs
about the role of TNW vis-à-vis NATO: if the opponent
has superior conventional forces, Russian needs
to rely on nuclear weapons. The Western and the East-
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