Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

exercises since 1999. All of them were military targets
involved in a potential attack against Russia and the
number of warheads involved in simulated strikes
was small (fewer than 10):
• Airbases as well as command, communications,
and support facilities in European NATO
countries and in at least one case in Japan. New
members of NATO are clearly considered first
candidates for basing countries for launching
an attack against Russia;
• Unknown targets in the continental United
States (most likely bases from which B-52s and
B-2s would fly missions against Russia);
• Aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific Ocean and
the Baltic Sea. Similar operations were simulated
at least one in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean;
and,
• U.S. bases on Diego Garcia and Guam.
An integral part of making sure that threat of limited
nuclear strike is credible is demonstrated ability
to escalate to the strategic level (the level of large-scale
nuclear exchange). 20 This condition necessitated the
maintenance of credible strategic nuclear deterrence
capability, giving additional prominence to the “traditional”
mission and strategic weapons modernization
programs.
The decision tree underlying the de-escalation scenario
is pictured in Figure 5-1. The 2003 White Paper also
cautioned that nuclear deterrence of regional conflicts
requires capable modern conventional forces: “only in
that case will the threat of nuclear use in response to
an attack be credible.” 21 This principle closely mirrors
one of the seminal documents in U.S. nuclear policy
from the 1950s, NSC-68. This is only logical: reliance
207