Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

this Russian statement essentially represents a loaded
gun held against the temple of the treaty, given the potential
for a reversal of the domestic balance of forces
in Russia, since the military has already argued as did
Putin that missile defenses in and of themselves represent
a threat to vital Russian interests like deterrent
capability and its strategic stability. Indeed, the overall
Russian reception of this treaty was not enthusiastic,
and its critics allege that just as the 1991 Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was detrimental to
Russia, so is this treaty. They particularly emphasize
the failure to constrain U.S. missile defenses. 127
Therefore the doctrine’s statements that: “The Russian
Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear
weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and
other types of weapons of mass destruction against
it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation involving the use
of conventional weapons when the very existence of
the state is under threat,” may be less than meets the
eye. 128 In fact, this represents only the public formulation
of the deeply contested nuclear use issue. As Patrushev
forecast, a classified document on nuclear use
was signed along with the doctrine, but obviously not
released for discussion. 129
THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND CHINA
Until now we have focused on Europe, but similar
dilemmas plague Russian strategists when they look
at Asia. Moscow sees Washington as trying to bring its
military forces closer to Russian borders in both Europe
and Asia. So this is not only a question of NATO
enlargement, but also of the enlargement of America’s
Asian-Pacific alliances. 130 Certainly, from Moscow’s
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