Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

As seen by a Russian expert:
In mid-2001 Putin suddenly softened the linkage [between
strategic offensive and defensive weapons] . . .
eventually permitting George W. Bush to scrap the
ABM Treaty without worrying about an adequate
Russian response. By doing so, Putin also undermined
the arguments of the opposition in the United States to
Bush’s decision that claimed that scrapping the Treaty
would lead to a new armaments race. 64
Similar realpolitik calculations apparently played a
mitigating role in defining Russia’s reaction to the initial
NATO enlargement. 65 Obviously, Vladimir Putin
was personally responsible for preventing outbursts
of indignation and promises of counteractions that
could not be supported by actual demonstrations of
Russian power and could do more harm than good to
the Russian reputation in Europe and beyond.
Moscow saw a relative “compensation” for ceding
ground on the ABMT and taking an accommodating
stand on global issues in the U.S. agreement to negotiate
and conclude the “Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty” (SORT), also referred to as the “Moscow
Treaty. 66 The Kremlin presented the signing of the
Treaty on May 24, 2002 as its “big success” despite
the Treaty’s alleged deficiencies, such as lack of explicit
elaborate verification and other implementing
arrangements, on the analogy with START, and the
possibility of “uploading” warheads removed from
their carriers for storage and not elimination at some
point in the future. 67
As the Soviets before them, the Russians saw arms
control negotiations and agreements creating a quintessential
paradigm for “equalizing” Russian and U.S.
roles in such key areas of international diplomacy
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