Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

tiatives aimed at reducing the Russian TNW arsenal.
Effectively, Russia has calculated that NATO would
be unable to part with U.S. TNW. So far this calculation
has proven solid and, given the outcome of internal
NATO debates in the spring of 2010, will continue
to succeed at least in the near future.
That said, recently some in the Russian military
apparently began to entertain more forward-looking
views on the future of the nonstrategic nuclear force.
While complete elimination is hardly on the books
and withdrawal of the small U.S. force from Europe
is not challenged, some thought has been given to designing
additional options. In fact, there is reason to
believe that in 2009 some in the military establishment
favored the inclusion of TNW into the New START
negotiations—a proposal that was rejected by military
leadership. There is also expectation that the United
States would insist on tackling TNW in the next stage
of nuclear arms reduction talks and that Russia should
prepare a position of its own. While these are clearly
minority views, the new developments represent a
welcome sign that the stone wall might be cracking.
MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR ARSENAL
Russian modernization programs are reasonably
well known, and for the purposes of this chapter require
only an overview of key trends. These can be
summarized as follows.
All three legs of the triad undergo modernization.
These programs are driven by the expiration of
warranty periods of systems inherited from the Soviet
Union (i.e., the intended length of service of the
weapon)—even though the warranty or length of
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