Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Justifications for modernization of the Russian
strategic triad were sought and found in American
declarations of intentions, statements, and announced
programs, such as the decision to resume the production
of plutonium parts for nuclear bombs 86 and
develop new types of efficient low-yield warheads. 87
Alarmist Russian media reports accompanied the appearance
of practically any official U.S. policy statement
dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons. 88
For many years leading to the emergence of a new
version of the RF Military Doctrine, Moscow tried to
fight off politically and diplomatically the expanding
U.S. BMD program and, in particular, U.S. plans to deploy
a third BMD site to deal with the growing threat
of Iranian missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The Medvedev government picked up the task of
opposing the third-site idea with enthusiasm. In his
first Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in November
2008, he threatened to move Iskander missiles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads into the Kaliningrad
area and provide other responses if and when the
United States deploys third site elements into Eastern
Europe. 89 Other asymmetrical countermeasures were
also mentioned with a clear intention to forewarn
the United States and threaten U.S. European allies.
For example, former RF Air Force Commander Petr
Deikin suggested adding nuclear X-55 cruise missiles
and the most recent non-nuclear version, X-555
(both may be carried on Tu-95M and Tu-160 strategic
bombers), to augment the political impact of Iskander
deployments. 90
Expediting work on a “tougher” version of the RF
Military Doctrine that would emphasize wider potential
use of nuclear weapons became an additional
measure in the Russian arsenal of “asymmetric mea-
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