Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Many of these challenges are unlikely to be overcome
rapidly. In the case of officer reform for example,
rather than achieving the leadership’s objectives (if
clearly defined) by 2020, it is more realistic to expect
the process (if pursued consistently) to take a generation.
Perhaps one of the central challenges facing the
reform relates to its undeclared aim, which is evident
in military exercises and several aspects of officer
training and procurement: the adoption of networkcentric
warfare principles.
While Russian military theorists have long written
about and advocated network-centric warfare, this
has intensified in two stages, with the first following
an analysis of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003,
and, more recently, after the announcement of the
“new look.” Although there is clearly theoretical understanding,
even sophistication within this “debate,”
it is equally accurate to designate the Russian military
as currently being at the beginning of a very long road
towards fully adopting such concepts and applying
them within their structures. This is not, as some commentators
or government officials appear inclined to
believe, merely a question of technology, procuring
the necessary high-technology assets including having
enough GLObal’naya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya
Sistema (GLONASS) satellites in orbit, but it also
places demands on the culture of the armed forces extending
into thought processes and attitudes. 28
Russia is still in the early stages of adopting network-centric
warfare, which will transition from the
current contact-based capabilities towards being able
to conduct noncontact operations. However, it is necessary
to stress that there are reasons to suggest this
will not happen as rapidly as the Russian leadership
might like. This is not only linked to the slow rate of
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