Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

In the absence of a final solution, a series of smallscale
partial agreements on various elements of the
relationship in the missile defense area seems more
feasible. These could address confidence building
measures and enhance transparency and predictability.
That is, conflicts seem unavoidable, but they can be
regulated and kept in check. There appears to be two
ways of tackling differences, neither fully acceptable
to the United States or Russia for reasons of domestic
politics.
The first option is enhanced predictability. All the
loud, sometimes shrill, statements notwithstanding,
Russia has never been concerned about short-term
American plans; even the George W. Bush administration’s
system was not regarded as an immediate threat.
Concern has been primarily about future capability,
which has so far remained undefined. Interaction in
the last decade has demonstrated that simple information
about plans is not sufficient because plans can
change; other ways to enhance predictability should
be considered together with enhanced consultations.
An ultimate predictability mechanism is a new fullscale
treaty on missile defense, but other, more limited
options should be considered.
The second option favored by Russia is a fully integrated
missile defense system. A strong cooperative
program in that area could change the lineup of
domestic parochial groups in Russia in favor of a more
moderate attitude toward American plans, but such a
joint system would give Russia a role in decisionmaking
on all aspects of building and operating it. That
degree of involvement and especially the right of veto
over the use of the system, whether formal or de facto,
is likely to be unacceptable to Washington, too.
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