Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

of strategic engagement with Russia, but this would
need to include an offer of assistance with conventional
defense reform to assuage concerns on the part
of some NATO members.
Thus far, Serdyukov’s reform agenda has been implemented
rapidly and with significant achievements.
These are mostly administrative achievements, such
as the transition to the permanent readiness brigades.
Yet, the challenges ahead are far deeper, and are more
connected with the value of the Russian state: its people.
More than the introduction of any new weapons
or equipment, the future of the Russian armed forces
will center on whether the state can harness and develop
a new generation of Russian officers, and for
each individual that will entail serving as an example,
delegating authority, bringing the best out of his
subordinates, encouraging a culture of initiative and
problem solving: in short leadership.
Russia is only in the early stages of conventional
defense reform, a process likely to endure for many
years, not least in terms of the transition towards network-centric
warfare capabilities. It is clear that many
critical issues are still in the melting pot, and are unlikely
to witness any speedy resolution. Consequently,
this domestic defense reform, coupled with the
China factor, makes it unlikely that TNW reduction
currently presents a realistic option. Serdyukov and
Makarov, probably in an effort to shore up support for
the reform, have undoubtedly exaggerated its success
to date and perhaps there will be a need, at some point
deemed as politically safe, to admit that major tasks
still lie ahead demanding more time. In this sensitive
context, any attempt to place TNW reduction on the
agenda risks unraveling that reform, possibly damaging
the reset in U.S.-Russian relations, and missing po-
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