Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

MIRVed ICBM and even the rail-mobile ICBM did not
classify as sufficiently ambitious, he said. 52
The SRF proudly advertizes the defense-penetration
properties of its new ICBMs 53 but conveniently
fails to mention that this capability was part of a Soviet-era
design. In particular, Topol-M features reduced
boost phase (about one-third of that of SS-18), which
was intended to reduce the effectiveness of spacebased
interceptors; today this capability is probably
less relevant. Topol-M can also carry a maneuverable
warhead known as Igla. There is no public authoritative
confirmation that Igla is actually being deployed
following a very small number of successful tests.
Overall, the anti-missile defense capability of new
Russian ICBMs should not be overestimated.
SLBM FORCE
Modernization of the sea leg of the triad has encountered
major technological and political failures.
The initial plan was apparently fairly logical: retain
the more modern Delta III and IV submersible submarine
ballistic nuclear (SSBNs), and eventually only the
latter, with replacement missiles, develop replacement
missiles for Typhoon SSBNs, and build new SSBNs to
carry the same missiles as Typhoons. This plan quickly
fell apart. The replacement for SS-N-20, known as
Bark, was canceled after three failed test flights. Although
the failures had been attributed to production
shortcomings and one Typhoon-class SSBN had been
converted for further tests of the Bark, 54 the contract
for the new solid-fuel SLBM was nevertheless given to
the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT),
the same that developed Topol and Topol-M ICBMs.
Design of the new SSBN had to be radically altered:
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