Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Russian commentators noted that he was speaking
entirely within the parameters of established Russian
doctrine and that he essentially conceded the failure
of conventional forces to provide adequate defense
and deterrence at the high end of the spectrum of conflict.
171 Beyond that, Baluyevsky invoked the use of nuclear
weapons in a first or preventive strike to defend
allies. While he probably meant largely the CIS states
to which Moscow has extended an unsolicited nuclear
umbrella, in the context of Russia’s Asia-Pacific territories,
his remarks bring us to the political dimensions
of Russia’s efforts to overcome the strategic challenges
it faces there. Here again, we see the inclination to
threaten limited nuclear war as part of the deterrence
strategy.
China’s rise presents Russia with difficult choices,
especially given its nuclear naval deficiencies. Russia
must take account of the growing internal pressure in
China to abandon its no first use policy and China’s
increased nuclear and apparent second-strike capability,
even as it must reduce its nuclear forces. 172 This
downward pressure on the Far East’s regional arsenal
was already apparent in 2004-05, and if Baluyevsky’s
remarks are to be taken seriously, it is likely that the
Northern Fleet’s nuclear forces and Russia’s NSNW
will become more important for consideration of deterrence
or first strike in the Asian as well as European
theater. As of 2004:
Currently, about 20% of the deployed Russian strategic
nuclear forces remain in the Eastern part of Russia.
As strategic forces shrink, the pace of reductions
in the region is the fastest. In particular, three of the
four divisions of the Russian Strategic Forces that have
been disbanded since 2000 were located here. And the
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