Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

led Russian military planners to rely on nuclear weapons
for the purposes of de-escalation—the threat of a
limited nuclear strike in response to a conventional attack
that cannot be repelled by conventional forces is
supposed to deter the attack in the first place.
A relatively recent new concern is deployment of
U.S. missile defense, which eventually could, in theory,
intercept a Russian nuclear second strike and thus
undermine both the existential deterrence capability
and the de-escalation mission. Deployment of missile
defense leads Russian military planners to suspect
that the United States intends to make the world safe
for conventional war and only serves to enhance the
perceived value of nuclear weapons for Russia.
Finally, there is the emerging issue of China, which
Russians rarely discuss in the open. While the two
countries are close partners or a broad range of issues,
have solved outstanding problems (border issues in
particular), and their economic relationship continues
to develop, many in Russia are concerned that
the partnership might not survive continued growth
of China’s economic, political, and military power.
Nuclear weapons are regarded as “just-in-case” protection
against the risk that China becomes a foe or at
least attempts to transform Russia into a subordinate
power.
Evolution of Russian views on the role of nuclear
weapons can be traced through Military Doctrines adopted
in the last 17 years. Military Doctrine is a primarily
political document that defines the broad contours
of defense policy and outlines of military postures as
well as provides a link between overall national security
policy and, more narrowly, defense policy. The
term “doctrine” is somewhat misleading, because its
meaning in Russian and English are not the same. It
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