Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

insist upon in 1991 was re-established nine years later
by Russia” under Vladimir Putin. 61
The START II Treaty had never entered into force.
Besides linking the fate of the Treaty to U.S. adherence
to the ABMT, the Russian legislative decision on
ratification made its implementation contingent on
the U.S. Senate ratifying a September 1997 addendum
to the treaty that included “Agreed Statements on
ABM-TMD Demarcation.” 62 Neither of these occurred
because of U.S. Senate opposition, where a faction
objected to any action supportive of the ABMT. On
June 14, 2002, one day after the United States formally
withdrew from the ABMT, Russia announced its withdrawal
from START II.
However, Russian “firmness” was of dubious political
and practical value. In effect, failure to prevent
the demise of the ABMT was apparently a good lesson
for the Putin government. It demonstrated that
no amount of rhetoric and verbal threats can affect
actions of a stronger and determined opponent. The
Russians realized that dragging their feet with START
II ratification, refusal to accept earlier compromise
proposals on BMD modification to accommodate particular
U.S. interests in developing limited ABM capabilities,
and, generally speaking, lack of flexibility and
failure to use windows of opportunity in fluid diplomatic
exchanges had resulted in the ultimate loss for
the weaker side.
To the credit of the Putin government and Vladimir
Putin personally, they refused the temptation to react
hysterically and stir up still another massive accusatory
campaign against the United States in response
to the actual U.S. moves to withdraw from the ABMT
(the U.S. announcement on the withdrawal was issued
on December 13, 2001, and the Treaty ceased to exist
on June 13, 2002.) 63
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