Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

sures” to counter the U.S. BMD and other perceived
American technological advances. In early August
2008, Russian media sources commented briefly on a
document allegedly prepared by the RF Defense Ministry
titled “Draft Concept of the Development of RF
Armed Forces Until 2030.” The official status of the
document was unclear. In all probability, it represented
a trial balloon by the Russian military establishment
intended to check expert and public reactions in
Russia and abroad to potential changes to the existing
RF Military Doctrine. 91
In December 2008, Russian media sources carried
a brief official statement attributed to Army-General
Yuri Baluyevsky, then-deputy secretary of the Russian
Security Council (formerly head of the Russian
General Staff), announcing that the “Security Council,
together with the Defense Ministry, other interested
bodies of state power, and both chambers of the parliament
commenced the preparation of the new military
doctrine of Russia.” 92 Baluyevsky was quoted saying:
I was charged to head the working groups of the RF
Security Council to prepare the draft of a new wording
of the country’s military doctrine that would respond
to contemporary challenges and threats, and
the existing changes in the geopolitical and militarypolitical
situation in the world, including the growing
role of military power in politics… The new version
of the military doctrine should become the response
to the most topical problems of assuring Russian military
security, including the legal foundations for the
legitimate use (“pravoprimemenie”) of nuclear weapons
as an instrument of strategic deterrence. 93
Along with Medvedev’s threats of forward missile
deployments, reviving the idea of a “tougher” revi-
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